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ABSTRACT 
  
 The traditional historiography of science from the late-nineteenth through the 
mid-twentieth centuries has broadly claimed that the Copernican revolution in astronomy 
irrevocably damaged the practice of judicial astrology. However, evidence to the contrary 
suggests that judicial astrology not only continued but actually expanded during the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. During this time period, judicial astrologers 
accomplished this by appropriating contemporary science and mathematics. Copernicus’s 
De revolutionibus, in particular, provided better mathematics for determining the 
positions of the planets than the prevailing Ptolemaic system and reformist astrologers 
interested in making astrology a precise, mathematical science embraced this new 
astronomy.  
This study evaluates the impact that Copernicus’s heliocentric theory of the 
cosmos had on the practice of judicial astrology, particularly within the English court 
patronage system between the publication of Copernicus’s De revolutionibus in 1543 and 
the Restoration of the monarchy and founding of the Royal Society in 1660. In England, 
while noble patrons defined the value of science in terms of its practical utility, many 
English judicial astrologers successfully argued for scientific legitimacy based on their 
ability to precisely predict planetary locations. Contrary to their European counterparts on 
the Continent, English patrons typically required tangible, practical results to justify their 
support of client-scientists. The heliocentric theory received a largely positive reaction in 
England, and many astrologers readily employed its mathematics to make more precise 
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predictions of planetary locations, which would presumably lead to better 
prognostications of human events. As long as scientists and patrons defined science in 
these exclusively mathematical terms, astrology could comfortably exist within these 
scientific boundaries.  
However, throughout the mid-sixteenth century, multiple processes occurred that 
changed astrology from a science into a popular belief in England. Patrons began to lose 
interest in astrology and thus financed fewer astrologers, and with the instability of the 
Civil War, fewer patrons were in positions of power to provide this sort of support. 
Furthermore, as astrology enjoyed increased popularity among the lower and merchant 
classes of England through almanac and pamphlet publications, scientists saw it in their 
best professional interest to consciously distance themselves from astrology and redefine 
and re-categorize it beyond the reasonable margins of proper scientific practice. In short, 
while astrology declined as a scientific activity during the latter half of the seventeenth 
century, it found success as a popular activity beyond the confines of conventional 
science. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When Copernicus wrote in his seminal astronomical treatise De revolutionibus 
orbium coelestium that “in so many…ways do the planets bear witness,” he was referring 
to how their observed motions provided evidence for the earth’s mobility.1 But for most 
of the scientifically-educated elite in sixteenth-century Europe, the planets bore witness 
in quite another way and provided evidence of a very different kind—that of their 
astrological influence over human events.2 Copernicus’s epoch-making work, of course, 
displaced the earth from the center of the cosmos and replaced it with the sun, but it also 
provided more precise calculations for the prediction of planetary positions than the 
Ptolemaic system. Among astrologers interested in applying this new astronomical data 
to the prognostication of human events, a great reform movement flourished throughout 
much of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Eventually, however, the reform 
movement foundered, scientists and their patrons lost interest, and astrology relocated to 
other more receptive venues. The narrative of astrology’s scientific decline in the latter 
half of the seventeenth century is less a story about the elimination of a superstition and 
more a story about how science was defined, who defined it, and what values determined 
its definition. Most scientists accepted astrology in the early sixteenth century and most 
                                                          
1
 Nicolaus Copernicus, De revolutionibus orbium coelestium [1543],trans. Edward Rosen (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1978).   
2
 See especially, Jim Tester, A History of Western Astrology (Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 1987), 197-201 
and Hilary M. Carey, Courting Disaster: Astrology at the English Court and University in the Later Middle 
Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), 92-116. Some later medieval and early modern rulers who 
were major proponents of astrology include Richard II of England, Charles V of France, Frederick II of the 
Holy Roman Empire, Ezzelino III da Romano of the March Treviso, as well as several Renaissance popes 
such as Innocent VIII, Leo X, and Paul III. 
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did not by the late seventeenth century—the responsibility for this lies not only in how 
astrology was reformed but also in how science was defined. What follows is an analysis 
of these two interconnected processes.             
Credit for the “demise” of astrology is usually given to the disintegration of the 
Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmos, which was inaugurated by Copernicus and fulfilled by 
Newton. However, considerable evidence suggests instead that the Copernican theory did 
not hinder the major positions of astrology and in some cases, for a time, actually 
bolstered them. Given the fact that Copernicus’s De revolutionibus offered a better 
mathematical model for determining the positions of the planets, its application in 
astrological texts should not be surprising; yet, few scholars have noted this with more 
than a passing interest. The traditional view of historians about Copernicanism and 
astrology argues that the Scientific Revolution in general and heliocentric astronomy in 
particular sounded the death knell for astrology as a serious academic discipline.3  
Auguste Bouché-Leclercq’s L’Astrologie Grecque, among the first works to view 
astrology in the context of the history of ideas rather than merely as a superstition, was 
typical of late nineteenth-century positivistic approaches to the history of science. 
Leclercq wrote that “once the Earth was reduced to the state of a planet and launched into 
space, the base [of astrology] was removed, and all the scaffolding crumbled at once” 
adding that there was a fundamental “incompatibility between astrology and the system 
                                                          
3
 See, for example, Don Allen Cameron, The Star-Crossed Renaissance: The Quarrel about Astrology its 
Influence in England (New York Octagon Books, 1941) and Theodore Otto Wedel, The Medieval Attitude 
toward Astrology, Particularly in England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920). 
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once proposed by Aristarchus of Samos, and since demonstrated by Copernicus.”4 
Leclercq argued that the “celestial influence” of the stars required a geometric focal 
point, and the geocentric model of the cosmos provided this astrological requisite. 
Despite his reasonably fair assessment of astrology—as a strain of Western thought once 
believed by great men and thus worthy of careful study—Leclercq followed the 
progressive historiographical tradition and praised the demise of astrology as part of the 
story of scientific advancement.    
Other historians from the early-twentieth century followed suit. Leclercq’s 
contemporary Franz Cumont averred that “progress in astronomy” ultimately destroyed 
astrology by destroying the “false hypothesis on which it is based, namely the geocentric 
theory of the universe.”5 Unlike Leclercq, who confined his research to mathematical 
astrology, Cumont expanded this approach to include not only scientific issues related to 
the study of astrology but also its religious aspects. Cumont was interested primarily in 
the Greco-Roman era, which led him to study the syncretic aspects of astrology and its 
relationship to the religions of Late Antiquity, Mithraism in particular.6 Though he did 
little research into early modern astrology, Cumont nevertheless mentioned Copernicus 
or heliocentrism over half a dozen times in his seminal work Astrology and Religion 
                                                          
4
 Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie Grecque (Paris: E. Lerous, 1899), 626. “Une fois la Terre réduite 
a l’état de planète et lancée dans l’éspace, la base se dérobant, tout l’échafaudage croula du même coup. Il 
n’y a d’incompatible avec l’astrologie que le systèm propose jadis par Aristarque de Samos, repris et 
démonstré depuis par Copernic.” My translation. All translations from French and Latin are my own or 
adapted from secondary sources unless otherwise noted. Sources of translations from all other languages 
are noted in the footnotes. 
5
 Franz Cumont, Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans (New York: Dover Publications, 
1960), xi. Originally published in 1912. 
6
 Although now nearly a century old, Cumont’s works, particularly Astrology and Religion among the 
Greeks and Romans, remain among the most authoritative books on the subject. For a more recent work 
covering similar topics in ancient astrology, see also Tamsyn Barton, Ancient Astrology (London: 
Routledge, 1994).  
4 
 
among the Greeks and Romans, ending his work with the conclusion that “Copernicus 
and Galileo” destroyed the old “eschatological ideas” evinced by religious astrology by 
“overthrow[ing] the system of Ptolemy and bring[ing] down those heavens peopled by 
bright beings.”7 Though he wrote nothing of the direct effects of Copernicanism on 
astrology, Cumont characterized the Scientific Revolution as a shift in worldview in 
which the “mysterious prestige” accorded to the stars ultimately gave way to the 
“celestial mechanics” of modern astronomy.8    
By the 1920s, heliocentrism’s role in the downfall of scientific astrology was 
taken for granted by most historians. For example, in his now classic Medieval Attitude 
toward Astrology, Theodore Otto Wedel wrote that “the final disproof of astrology was 
never written,” arguing that as long the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian model of the cosmos 
dominated the universities, “refutation was impossible.”9 Examining the decline of the 
Ptolemaic-Aristotelian version of the cosmos, which began with Copernicus, Wedel 
assumed that all fields of study using the geocentric theory ceased to function when those 
foundations were removed. Wedel added that “with the arrival of the new astronomy of 
Copernicus, [refutation] was no longer necessary.”10 Similarly, Christopher Macintosh 
considered the work of Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo to have “rendered obsolete the 
cosmology on which astrology was based.”11 This traditional history, however, is wrong. 
Astrology remained a respected component of a typical early modern higher education 
                                                          
7
 Cumont, Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans, 202. 
8
 Ibid., xvi. 
9
 Wedel, The Medieval Attitude toward Astrology, 89. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Christopher Macintosh, The Astrologers and their Creed: An Historical Outline (New York: Frederick 
Praeger, 1969), 77. 
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for well over a century after Copernicus’s death and successfully incorporated the 
heliocentric theory.  
Not all historians unquestioningly accepted this traditional assessment of the 
decline and ultimate failure of astrology nor did they note Copernicus or the Scientific 
Revolution as its principal undoing. As early as 1954, George Sarton issued a direct 
statement challenging this view, arguing that “the claims of astrology are independent of 
whether the earth or the sun is placed at the center” and reminding historians of science 
that “astrology did not disappear after the acceptance of the Copernican system but 
continued to grow abundantly.”12 Similarly, although Keith Thomas in his influential 
1971 work Religion and the Decline of Magic repeated the conventional wisdom that “the 
intellectual pretentions of astrological theory were irreparably shattered” by the 
Copernican revolution, he qualified this assessment with the caveat that “heliocentrism 
was consistent with astrology” because the stars still exerted an influence over the earth 
no matter its position in the heavens—all that this new conceptual strategy required was a 
new set of calculations.13 However, since Thomas’s primary historical interests revolved 
around the social and religious implications of the rise of modern scientific thinking on 
popular beliefs, he proceeded no further with this line of thinking.  
Finally, the writings of Eugenio Garin in the late 1970s and early 1980s, while 
repeating many of the same arguments of Sarton and Thomas, attempted to integrate the 
                                                          
12
 George Sarton, Ancient Science and Modern Civilisation (New York: Harper, 1959), 61. This book is 
made up of lectures Sarton delivered as part of the ongoing Montgomery Lecture series. The above quote 
comes from a lecture delivered at the University of Nebraska in 1954. See also Eugenio Garin, Astrology in 
the Renaissance: The Zodiac of Life, trans. Carolyn Jackson and June Allen (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, Ltd., 1983), first published as Lo Zodiaco della Vita, x.  
13
 Keith Thomas, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Century England (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1971), 349. 
6 
 
history of astrology and particularly Renaissance astrology into the broader history of the 
Scientific Revolution. His most influential work Astrology in the Renaissance stands as a 
late addition in the backlash against the teleological progressivism of early- and mid-
twentieth century histories of science. Historiographically, it also cautions of the dangers 
of what Maurice Mandelbaum called the “retrospective fallacy,” a presentist bias in 
which the accomplishments of science in the past are judged historically important in 
proportion to their later corroboration.14 Since modern historians viewed astrology as 
unscientific in the present, this preconception found its way into their assessment of 
astrology in the past. On the other hand, Garin argued for a great degree of continuity 
between medieval and early modern science, and used the Copernican impact on 
astrology as evidence of this point. He wrote that “if, after Copernicus had completely 
revolutionised the structure of the cosmos, and Kepler and Graz had still to adapt 
themselves once again to casting horoscopes, this only means that the origins of modern 
science did not come from either a radical break or from an instantaneous 
enlightenment.”15 To Garin, the continued existence of practicing astrologers after the 
Copernican revolution not only showed that the new cosmology could assimilate 
astrology but also disproved the very idea of a “revolution” in science. Nevertheless, 
none of these three scholars tackled the problem of how Copernicus or Copernican 
mathematics specifically affected the practice of astrology, confining their interpretations 
to the philosophical, religious, and cultural consequences of such a shift in worldview.  
                                                          
14
 See David B. Wilson, “The Historiography of Science and Religion,” in Science and Religion: A 
Historical Introduction, ed. Gary B. Ferngren (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2002), 23; and 
Maurice Mandelbaum, History, Man, and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1971). 
15
 Garin, Astrology in the Renaissance, 9. 
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The only scholar to directly address the impact of the Copernican theory on 
astrological practice was Mary Ellen Bowden. In her 1974 work The Scientific Revolution 
in Astrology, Bowden averred that astrology failed not due to anything intrinsically 
wrong with the system or to changes wrought by the new science of Copernicus, Galileo 
and Newton, but because it failed to undergo a revolution in the way that astronomy and 
physics did during this same period. Bowden explicitly argued that neither heliocentrism 
nor telescopic evidence proving the heavens were no longer immutable undermined the 
task of astrological reformers. Her research demonstrated how mathematical astrologers 
used empirical, experimental, and observational evidence to reform astrology during the 
Scientific Revolution. However, while Bowden focused on how the attempt at revolution 
failed, it is my intention to examine how practicing mathematical astrologers received the 
new Copernican mathematical models for the positions of the planets and how it affected 
their status as legitimate scientists. Given the resilience of astrology in the face of what, 
from the modern, rational perspective, seem to be insurmountable scientific obstacles, the 
impact of Copernicanism on early modern mathematical astrology deserves a more 
nuanced approach than it has received in these previous works.  
Discussion of the issue of Copernicanism and its effects on astrology must 
contend with problems of indefinite terminology and the multiplicity of meanings of the 
term “astrology.” By the modern definition, astrology attempts to interpret the meaning 
of the positions and movements of celestial bodies, which are believed to have certain 
influences over the earth, in order to prognosticate future events or determine the 
characters or dispositions of human beings. During the early modern era, however, the 
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modern categories of astronomy and astrology were completely intertwined. Astrology, 
or astrologia, was the general term used to describe the study of the stars during this 
period.16 This included two categories: judicial astrology and natural astrology. The 
natural branch of astrology dealt with the positions of the sun, moon, planets, and stars 
and the physical influences they exerted over the material world, including the change of 
the seasons, the prediction of eclipses, the positions and paths of the planetary orbits, 
meteor showers, the coming of comets, tides, and so on.17 This knowledge—today 
classified broadly under the category of astronomy—contributed to the increased 
accuracy of calendars, indicated the best times for the planting and harvesting of crops, 
and improved navigation. On the other side, judicial astrologers studied the physical 
influence that the heavenly bodies exerted over people. This included the prognostication 
of major historical events, the preparation of horoscopes, the determination of auspicious 
moments for embarking on journeys, and the like.18 In short, astrology could be used as 
                                                          
16
 I have attempted to retain traditional medieval and early modern terminology by referring to “astrology” 
as any area of study that has to do with the stars, regardless of whether or not it the foretelling of the future 
is involved. Astronomy and astrology did not distinguish themselves from one another until the late in the 
Scientific Revolution. “Astrology” encompassed both judicial astrology and natural astrology.  Natural 
astrology and astronomy can be used interchangeably when they refer only to the study of the stars without 
regards to the influences they pose on human decision making, fate, and free will. 
17
 David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in 
Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1450 (Chicago: Chicago University 
Press, 1992), 274. 
18
 Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science, 274; Tester, History of Western Astrology, 19 and 123; 
Wedel, Medieval Attitude toward Astrology, 27.The Greeks of the fourth and third centuries B.C.E. used 
the term astrologia to describe both the study of the movements of the heavens and the use of those 
movements to foretell future events, and this term remained intact into the early modern period. 
Astronomia, the origin of the English word astronomy, was rare in antiquity, and there was no clear attempt 
to distinguish them until Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae (ca. 630). Isidore defined astronomia as the study 
of the movements of the heavens and the naming of the stars and planets, while astrologia was divided into 
the physical study of the stars and planets, which remained virtually indistinct from astronomia, and the 
superstitious study, which he referred to as mathematici. The term mathematici was often employed to 
indicate those who prophesied by the stars during the late medieval and early modern era. 
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an umbrella term under which any discipline related to the study of the stars could be 
placed. 
The dichotomization of astronomy and astrology into separate categories is 
instead a modern invention that does not characterize their relationship in the sixteenth 
century, and early sixteenth-century astrologers were often experts in “astronomical” 
knowledge. In the early modern era, judicial astrology required knowing the precise 
location of the sun, moon, and planets relative to the stars and the constellations. There 
were various forms of judicial astrology, which required knowledge of planetary 
positions at different times. For natal, or horoscopic, astrology, the positions of the 
celestial bodies at a subject’s birth were necessary to make predictions. For horary 
astrology, astrologer-astronomers required the positions of these heavenly bodies at the 
time a particular question was asked, while electional astrology depended on knowledge 
of the future position of the stars and planets in order to determine the most propitious 
moment to get married or wage war.19 Typically, rather than observing the heavens 
themselves, practicing astrologer-astronomers consulted tables which provided 
information on the location of celestial bodies at given times and places. Since the second 
century C.E., these tables had been prepared using the method of calculation developed 
by Ptolemy, an adherent of the geocentric model of the cosmos, whose Almagest and 
Tetrabiblos formed the backbone of early modern astronomy and astrology.20  
                                                          
19
 Benson Bobrick, The Fated Sky: Astrology in History (New York: Simon and Schuster Press, 2005), 22-
26. 
20
 Lindberg, 274-5; Tester, 12-13. 
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However, because Ptolemy’s system was limited in its accuracy, the resulting 
tables contained errors which, while minuscule in the short term, accumulated over the 
course of several centuries. By the thirteenth century, Ptolemy’s calculations were off by 
as much as two degrees of arc or four times the width of the moon.21 While four times the 
width of the moon, or eight minutes, may seem trivial, it was enough to change sun and 
moon signs for some individuals born on the cusp between zodiacal signs or skew the 
results of electional astrology, which depended on knowing the precise time to complete 
a particular task. Furthermore, Ptolemy calculated the precession of the equinox at one 
degree for every one hundred years, rather than the actual figure of one degree per 
seventy-two years. Precession caused the ecliptic to slowly move westward against the 
fixed stars at this rate, causing the actual position of the ecliptic relative to the zodiac to 
be off by more than six degrees. Several attempts to rectify these calculations were 
made—most notably the Alfonsine tables, which were constructed between 1252 and 
1270—but by the opening of sixteenth century, astrologers realized that the Ptolemaic 
system required more than merely revision.22  
The new Copernican model of the cosmos provided more precise calculations for 
the positions of the planets, and many astrologer-astronomers used these calculations in 
order to maintain the scientific legitimacy they already possessed. Many judicial 
astrologers valued precision, in the sense of more reliable and more repeatable 
                                                          
21
 Thomas Kuhn, The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western 
Thought, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 68-77; Thomas, Religion and the Decline of 
Magic, 288; Nicholas Campion, A History of Western Astrology, Vol. 2: The Medieval and Modern Worlds 
(London: Continuum Books, 2010), 106-111. See also James Evans, The History and Practice of Ancient 
Astronomy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 262-266; and Bobrick, The Fated Sky, 23.  
22
 Owen Gingerich, “Alfonso X as a Patron of Astronomy,” in Alfonso X of Castile, the Learned King 
(1221-1284) (Harvard Studies in Romance Languages 43, 1990), 345. 
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predictions of the positions of the heavenly bodies, just as much as the ability of 
astrologers to make dependable predictions about human affairs. In this way, the 
Copernican system made judicial astrology measurable and repeatable—and hence more 
“scientific”—in that knowledge of the locations of stars and planets became more 
precise, even though these did not necessarily lead to more accurate predictions of human 
events. As Theodore Porter has argued, “there is a strong incentive to prefer precise and 
standardizable measures to highly accurate ones” because “accuracy is meaningless if the 
same operations and measurements cannot be performed” elsewhere.23 When applied to 
early modern judicial astrology, this suggests that accurate prognostication would be 
difficult to define if the methods used to arrive at these predictions did not employ the 
most precise observational data. Eventually, precision regarding the positions of the 
planets became “standardizable” as Copernican—and later Keplerian and Galilean—
astronomy rendered these calculations repeatable. Perhaps most importantly, predictions 
of the positions of the planets were convincing to patrons for whom practical results were 
becoming the defining standard of value. In the words of Stephen Pumphrey and Frances 
Dawbarn, “patrons…wanted proof” as their criteria for acceptable scientific practice, and 
by that standard, the Copernican theory did contribute to astrological legitimacy.24  
English astrologer-astronomers during roughly the century between the 
publication of Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus and the Civil War stand out as a 
particularly pertinent case study because their burgeoning interest in practical, 
                                                          
23
 Theodore Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public Life (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1995), 29. 
24
 Stephen Pumfrey and Frances Dawbarn, “Science and Patronage in England, 1570-1625: A Preliminary 
Study,” History of Science, Vol. 42 (2004): 141. 
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mathematical methods was reinforced by the pragmatic tendencies of the English court 
patronage system. Patronage systems in early modern Europe have been classified, in the 
terminology of Pumfrey and Dawbarn, as either “utilitarian” or “ostentatious.”25 The 
purpose of the ostentatious model was to exalt the cultural prestige of the patron. 
Utilitarian patronage, on the other hand, existed to benefit the patron in tangible ways: to 
increase their financial wealth, enhance their prowess on the battlefield, or improve 
navigational aptitude for their overseas ventures. Judicial astrology could exist 
comfortably within either patronage system depending on the practitioner or the patron. 
While the continental model of patronage, particularly in the Holy Roman Empire and the 
Italian city-states, prized the ostentatious system, the English court embraced the 
utilitarian.26 Because many English judicial astrologers successfully argued for scientific 
legitimacy based on their ability to precisely predict planetary locations, English patrons 
regarded their services as a practical utility that conformed to the methodology of 
science. I will argue that as utilitarian patronage came to dominate the English system in 
the sixteenth century, astrologers used Copernican precision to gain status as scientific 
and attract the attention of patrons. Among early modern English scientists, it eventually 
became a problem that post-Copernican precision in the prediction of planetary locations 
                                                          
25
 Ibid., 137. 
26
 For examples of the ostentatious patronage system, see especially, Mario Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier: The 
Practice of Science in the Culture of Absolutism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Paula 
Findlen, Possessing Nature: Museums, Collecting, and Scientific Culture in Early Modern Italy (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 1994); and William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of 
Secrets in Medieval and Early Modern Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Less work 
has been done on the more utilitarian system. One good introduction is Bruce T. Moran, ed., Patronage and 
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did not lead to greater accuracy in the prognostication of human events. However, since 
human events were so difficult to quantify, judicial astrologers eager to make their 
practice scientific ignored this in favor of what could be reliably measured. This changed 
when the focus of scientific activity moved beyond the English courts to the universities 
and Royal Society and judicial astrology became the domain of the popular classes in the 
second half of the seventeenth century. Then, it was in the interest of practicing scientists 
to distance themselves from astrology and redefine it as outside the boundaries of 
legitimate science.          
This study examines the impact of Copernicanism on judicial astrology within the 
English court patronage system between the introduction of heliocentrism to England in 
1540s through roughly the reign of Charles I, though I will place significant focus on the 
Elizabethan and Jacobean eras. While this may seem like an arbitrary place to end this 
study, the main reasons for limiting it in this way is because the patronage system on 
which I focus began to decline in importance following the Restoration in 1660 as the 
locus of scientific activity shifted from noble courts to universities and the newfound 
Royal Society.27 Chapter One provides a brief history of astrology from its origins in 
ancient Babylon and outlines its state at the time of Copernicus, paying particularly close 
attention to the “crisis” of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century astrology—as it was described 
by many writers at the time—because many of the issues of precision, accuracy, and 
repeatability with which English astrologers were faced emerged out of this earlier 
generation. The chapter ends with a brief retelling of the story of Copernicus’s 
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publication of De revolutionibus, well-trodden ground to be sure, but it is necessary in 
order to expand upon its particular importance within the astrological world. Chapter 
Two relates the history of the reception of the heliocentric theory in England from its first 
appearance in print in 1556 to its first unqualified acceptance as a physical reality in 1576 
to its acceptance based on observational evidence in the 1610s. Chapter Three deals with 
the appropriation of Copernican mathematics in service of astrology, specifically within 
the context of the patronage system in England and the court culture of both nobles and 
monarchs during the late Tudor and early Stuart ages. Finally, Chapter Four continues 
this story up through the 1650s and compares mathematical astrology as it was practiced 
in the courts with other institutional contexts during the same era—primarily in 
universities, in almanacs, in popular culture, and among the great exchanges between 
men of letters who argued for and against astrology based on their own experience within 
these institutions. 
Many histories of astrology that take their story through the early modern era find 
it obligatory to end with a narrative of astrology’s decline and ultimate demise in the late 
seventeenth century as a matter of necessity. After relating astrology’s three-and-a-half 
millennia historical success, they often end on a gloomy note, describing its failures in 
the late seventeenth century, or conversely, they end with a celebratory tone of scientific 
triumphalism. In either case, the story simply ends. The superstition has been overcome; 
the light of rationality has finally shone through. The formula for writing historically 
about astrology usually ends long before the modern era, and it ends in failure.   
15 
 
In a sense, for this paper, I have turned this formula on its head, instead beginning 
with astrology’s failures and ending my own narrative with its greatest successes, or at 
least its re-categorization into a field that allowed it to find success outside of the 
scientific mainstream. By failures, I mean the difficulties in mathematical and 
observational precision with which astrologers had to contend in the early modern era, 
and by success, I refer to astrology’s rise in popularity among the newly literate classes of 
the mid-seventeenth century just as it was being abandoned by scientists for being 
unscientific. Failure, however, is too strong a word. Astrology did not fail—it merely 
ceased to be a science. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
FROM PTOLEMY TO COPERNICUS: 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL ASTROLOGY 
  
Astrology has a long and complex history, and it will be useful to track its 
development from its origins in second millennium B.C.E. Mesopotamia to the 
Renaissance era of “crisis” before describing the impact of Copernicanism on its practice. 
From the end of the Roman Empire until the Later Middle Ages, most objections to 
astrology were religiously motivated, and in general, revolved around the issue of 
preserving the free will of the individual and the power of God over the world. By the 
fourteenth century, skeptical scholars began to attack it for its lack of scientific rigor and 
its failure to properly use mathematics. It was into this intellectual climate that 
Copernicus emerged as an astronomer concerned with constructing a mathematically 
precise model of the movements of the heavenly bodies, and while he appears to have 
had little interest in astrology, the problems that astrologers faced during his lifetime 
were the same ones he tackled when he set out to revise the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian 
system.   
Astrology had many independent origins chronologically and geographically, but 
the Western version had its foundations as an organized discipline in Babylonian 
Mesopotamia around 1800 B.C.E. and arose simultaneously with the Babylonian creation 
of the first star charts in global history.28 Generally speaking, astrology enjoyed 
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unquestioned legitimacy in ancient Mesopotamia because it grew out of both the 
Babylonian religious tradition and the astronomical tradition. The Babylonian religion 
considered the stars and planets divine, and this religious devotion to the heavens led to 
meticulous study. Because of this integration of religious and scientific ideas about the 
power of the planets, Babylonians believed that the heavenly bodies exerted influences 
over human affairs.29  
Although the foundations of Babylonian astrology had been laid in the second 
millennium B.C.E., for nearly a thousand years, Babylonian astrology remained entirely 
“mundane,” meaning that astrologers predicted only events for nations or the world at 
large, rather than casting horoscopes for individuals.30 Babylonian astronomers were able 
to predict the positions of the sun and moon and the dates of eclipses with a great deal of 
accuracy, but they were less adept at predicting the positions of the planets, and their 
ability to predict the positions of the sun and moon were never applied in any technical 
sense to draw individual horoscopes.31 The most important concern in the Babylonian 
version of astrology was to create accurate calendars, which served religious or 
ceremonial purposes.32 An interest in planetary motion and the ability to determine their 
locations with some degree of precision finally began to emerge in Mesopotamia around 
the eighth century B.C.E., and this form of astrology made its way westward to the 
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ancient Greeks over the next several centuries.33 The mathematical techniques and 
observational precision necessary for constructing tables indicating the positions of 
heavenly bodies, drawing nativities, and casting horoscopes—those things now most 
associated with astrology—materialized around the fourth century in Greece.34 Though 
the Babylonians had begun this process, their lack of interest in the movement of the 
planets meant that the methods of later medieval and early modern astrology were not 
present in the ancient Near East and did not emerge until the Hellenistic era.  
Hellenistic astrology, which would develop and expand upon the techniques of 
charting stars, drawing nativities, and casting horoscopes, laid the groundwork for the 
type of astrology that would flourish for nearly two millennia in Europe.35 Although their 
founders showed little interest in the practice of astrology, Pythagorean, Platonic, and 
Aristotelian schools of thought, in their later forms, all came to accommodate astrological 
discourse within their cosmologies.36 All of the major precepts of astrology were 
logically consistent with these worldviews and within these frameworks, particularly the 
Aristotelian conception of the cosmos, astrology was able to thrive. From the Hellenistic 
era to the early modern era, the principles of astrology became intertwined with 
Aristotelian cosmology and this cosmological schema provided a system within which 
astrology made sense.  
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Aristotle’s cosmos consisted of concentric spheres with the earth at the center and 
a sphere of fixed stars at the outermost reaches. Physical laws acted differently depending 
on an object’s position within the cosmos. The supralunar sphere, the entire universe 
above the moon, was an incorruptible, unchangeable realm where all movement was 
perfectly circular and, in general, predictable. Birth, generation, decay, and death, on the 
other hand, characterized the sublunar region. It was a world of transience.37 The 
predictability of the movements of the stars and planets in the supralunar sphere, the 
obvious parallels between the movement of the sun across the ecliptic and the changing 
of the seasons, and the relationship between the moon and the tides, among other things, 
led astrologers to the conclusion that the heavens exerted an enormous influence over all 
aspects of the sublunar sphere.38 Moreover, the general predictability of events in the 
supralunar sphere, combined with their observed impact on the sublunar sphere, caused 
astrologers to envision a relationship between the upper and lower spheres suggesting 
that the heavens were the key to predicting all sublunar activity. As events in the heavens 
became more predictable, astrologers believed that this knowledge could be employed to 
make the sublunar realm more predictable as well.    
As Aristotelian natural philosophy was adopted by the Romans throughout the 
last two centuries before Christ, astrological writings flourished, and astrologers took 
Aristotelian physical and geocentric cosmology as the underpinning of their astrology. 
During the early empire, especially in Eastern, Hellenistic scholarly centers such as 
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Alexandria, a number of astrological texts were produced that began to form an orthodox 
version of astrology. For example, Marcus Manilius’s Astronomicon (ca. 10 C.E.), an 
astrological textbook written in Greek hexameter verse, provided the first account of the 
signs of the zodiac as they are known today, as well as the first account of casting 
horoscopes based on planetary positions within these “houses.”39 Dorotheus of Sidon’s 
didactic five-part poem the Pentateuch (ca. 75 C.E.) delineated the different varieties of 
astrology, dividing its practice for the first time into natal, hoary, and electional varieties. 
Vettius Valen’s encyclopedic compilation, the Anthology (ca. 150 C.E.), provided 
numerous techniques for forecasting horoscopes and included several example 
horoscopes and natal charts. The most important work—both at the time and in later 
centuries—was the Tetrabiblos by the Hellenized Egyptian Ptolemy (90-168 C.E.), which 
became the cornerstone of astrology in the medieval and early modern eras.40 In 
conjunction with Ptolemy’s other great work, the Almagest, which described the 
geocentric universe mathematically, the Tetrabiblos constituted a formidable edifice of 
astrological authority.41 
Within the Tetrabiblos, Ptolemy treated astrology hierarchically, beginning with 
the general and working toward the particular. Book I offered procedural rules for 
prognostication, describing the movement of the planets and stars, the use of calculations, 
and how to understand the results. Book II detailed the collective aspects of astrology 
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generally applicable to large populations or nations, and Books III and IV together 
offered more specific details of individual astrology, or those things which may be 
determined by the positions of the stars and planets at the conception, birth, and other 
important moments in the life of the person whose horoscope has been cast.42 The 
Tetrabiblos achieved popularity in part because, unlike some other Hellenistic works on 
astrology, it did not delve into the complicated mathematics astrology had developed by 
the first century C.E. but rather presented a history of astrology and systematized and 
simplified the great mass of detailed information about the science.43 However, 
Ptolemy’s Almagest, which provided the requisite astronomical data for the astrological 
topics presented in the Tetrabiblos, delivered the specific corresponding mathematical 
information needed to calculate the positions of the planets and stars in order to put the 
Tetrabiblos into practice.44 Ptolemy defined astrology in terms that made it wholly 
natural and scientific, consciously eliminating the “mystical” elements it retained in other 
versions. In fact, he rejected much of the traditional astrology that had been popular 
during the Hellenistic era. 
In the Tetrabiblos, astrology emerged as a mathematical, natural science 
intimately connected to the Aristotelian worldview, and the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian 
cosmos that arose in the first century C.E. became the dominant astronomical and 
astrological system until the sixteenth century. Moreover, Ptolemy defined astrology in a 
way that promoted it as a science as opposed to a divinatory or semi-religious practice. 
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“As for the nonsense on which many waste their labor and of which not even a plausible 
account can be given,” Ptolemy wrote, referring to those whose adherence to astrology 
was motivated by religious devotion, “this we shall dismiss in favor of the primary 
natural causes.”45 While Ptolemy insisted that astrology had to follow the rules of 
science, he conceded that astrology was at best a conjectural rather than exact science. 
However, he considered the determination of the precise positions of the heavenly bodies 
as the key to making astrology scientific and making predictions as accurate as possible: 
Prognostication made by persons of this class [non-scientists] must be frequently 
fallacious, owing to their deficiency in science and their consequent inability to 
give necessary consideration to the time and place, or to the revolutions of the 
planets; all which circumstances, when exactly defined and understood, certainly 
tend towards accurate foreknowledge.46 
 
Ptolemy criticized “the scientific vanity” of those astrological practitioners who 
attempted to prognosticate without the use of accurate star charts because “they receive 
no confirmation from nature” and their techniques “are not capable of being rationally 
demonstrated.”47 Without prognostication based on the scientific observation of the stars, 
Ptolemy regarded any astrology as illegitimate and incapable of rendering accurate 
predictions of human events.  
Ptolemy’s purpose in writing the Tetrabiblos was to place astrology within the 
cosmological framework of Aristotelianism and the philosophical framework of 
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Stoicism.48 The philosophy of Stoicism, which was at its peak during the first century 
C.E., aligned with astrology quite well. Its insistence on the power of fate, the 
deterministic nature of the universe, and the individual’s ability to adjust his will to be in 
harmony with this universe mirrored the type of astrology that Ptolemy attempted to 
cultivate. With astrology as a scientific enterprise, practitioners could attain some 
knowledge to gain control over the uncontrollable and inexorable forces of the universe. 
And with the procedural rules of the Tetrabiblos and the observations and calculations of 
Almagest, the dual studies of astrology and astronomy rested firmly on a geocentric, 
Ptolemaic-Aristotelian foundation for the next fifteen hundred years. 
With the Christianization of Europe and the dissolution of the Roman Empire, 
astrology, like much other learning in the Latin West, became dormant. The Christian 
attitude toward astrology was varied and ranged from qualified approval to outright 
rejection. Typically, Christian arguments against astrology consisted of general 
complaints that as a pagan science, practicing astrology amounted to a form of heresy. 
The other principal complaint was that astrology contravened free will, which was 
crucially important for Christians who believed that it was through individual free will 
that Christians could choose to follow Christ.49  
In spite of these complaints, astrology survived and gained some degree of 
respectability in the new Christian intellectual environment of medieval Europe. By the 
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fifth century, the seven liberal arts had ascended to prominence as the essential 
educational curriculum for the clergy.50 The seven liberal arts consisted of the trivium of 
grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, followed by the more advanced quadrivium of 
arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. The science of astrology survived as a 
subfield of astronomy in the medieval curriculum.51 Furthermore, as medieval historian 
Valerie Flint has argued, astrology survived in the early Middle Ages precisely because it 
could be employed to combat what many Christian authorities considered even more 
dangerous forms of magic. Flint claims that astrology was rehabilitated during the Middle 
Ages because it was “Christianized” and used against what Christian thinkers perceived 
to be far more dangerous challenges to the Church, such as witchcraft, demonology, or 
the use of illicit magic.52 The mathematical practice of astrology and the technical 
knowledge required to fully understand it exercised the mind to a high degree, which 
appealed greatly to early medieval clerics who emphasized the more ascetic life of the 
monasteries. Additionally, the use of astronomical data was essential for calculating the 
canonical hours of prayer and dates of moveable feasts such as Easter. This assured that 
the framework of astrology remained intact throughout the Middle Ages.   
Although astrology retained this respectability, it was criticized on religious 
grounds. The Christian writers of the first few centuries after Christ, especially the 
Church Fathers and Augustine of Hippo in particular, urged new Christians to abandon 
old pagan superstitions such as astrology in favor of free will and the option of salvation 
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through Christ. Augustine had dabbled in many philosophies in the personal quest that 
would eventually lead him to Christianity, including Manichaeism and Greek skepticism, 
both of which were more receptive to astrology. Augustine criticized astrology on 
religious grounds, arguing that “a devout Christian must avoid astrologers and all 
impious soothsayers, especially when they tell you the truth, for fear of leading his soul 
into error by consorting with demons and entangling himself with the bonds of such 
association.”53 Significantly, in his denunciation, Augustine also appealed to reason and 
logic to counter the argument for astrology. Twins, he wrote, were by definition born at a 
time when the stars should rule over them in identical ways and that if astrology were a 
valid science then we should expect to see them live their lives with comparable 
personalities, social statuses, and fates.  However, 
[The astrologers] have never been able to explain why twins are so different in 
what they do and achieve, in their professions and skills, in the honors they 
receive, and in other aspects of their lives and deaths.  In all such matters, twins 
are often less like each other than complete strangers; yet, twins are born with 
practically no interval of time between their births and are conceived in precisely 
the same moment of a single sexual semination.54  
Augustine attributed the occasional success of astrologers to simple luck and said “that 
guesswork was often borne out of mere chance. If an astrologer made a great many 
predictions, several of them would later prove to be true, but he could not know it at the 
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time and would only hit upon them by chance.”55 Augustine argued, with reference to 
Hippocrates, that the more likely explanation for the similarity in the life twins was that 
they shared similar medical circumstances “since their parents’ condition at the time of 
conception could easily affect the embryos, and it would be no wonder if the twins should 
be born with the same kind of health, since they had developed in the same way in their 
mother’s womb.”56 In other words, there were many explanations to account for 
similarities among individuals born at the same time that did not require resorting to 
astrological influence. 
Despite his unwavering dismissal of astrology as way to foretell the future, 
Augustine, like most other Christian thinkers with a classical education, affirmed that the 
stars could in fact have an influence on the earth and the material of the sublunar sphere 
and that this could affect man insomuch as man was subject to the happenings of nature. 
“It is not absurd to say, with reference only to physical differences,” wrote Augustine, 
that there are certain sidereal [stellar] influences. We see that seasons of the year 
change with the approach and the receding of the sun.  And with the waxing and 
waning of the moon, we see certain kinds of things grow and shrink, such as sea 
urchins and oysters, and the marvelous tides of the ocean.  But the choices of the 
will are not subject to the positions of the stars.57  
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Man’s will was untouchable, but his body, being simply matter, was susceptible to 
astrological authority. Augustine consciously demarcated natural and judicial astrology in 
his criticism, allowing for the former while condemning the latter. The basis of 
Augustine’s argument—that judicial astrology flouted Christian free will—became 
standard among those who attacked astrology throughout the Middle Ages, and many 
astrologers went to great lengths to demonstrate that their astrological predictions 
allowed for free will. Provided that they avoided this trapping and properly qualified 
astrology to acquiesce to free will, astrologers continued to practice largely unabated 
throughout the Middle Ages.  
By the fourteenth century, astrology was practiced as a science at royal courts and 
in universities but had begun to come under attack by skeptical scholars on scientific as 
well as theological grounds.58 Beginning in the Later Middle Ages, the terms of the 
controversy transformed into a scientific debate about the legitimacy of astrology’s 
mathematical techniques. For example, Nicole Oresme, an especially vociferous 
opponent of judicial astrology, argued that natural astrology was grounded in 
mathematics, but complained that judicial astrologers rarely applied this to their practice. 
In his Livre de Divinacions of ca. 1365, Oresme, like Augustine, acknowledged that 
“[natural] astrology is speculative and mathematical, a very noble and excellent science 
and set forth in the books [of astrology] very subtly, and this part can be adequately 
known,” but he argued that using this knowledge to make prognostications about human 
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events was futile because the positions of the heavenly bodies “cannot be known 
precisely and with punctual exactness, as I have shown in my treatise on the 
Measurements of the Movements of the Heavens and have proved by reason founded on 
mathematical demonstration.”59 Oresme continued that not only did astrologers lack the 
necessary mathematical precision to apply planetary positions to foretelling future events, 
but also that those that were known were outdated:  
We know too little about it and in particular the rules in the book are false…and 
have either slight proof or none. And some of them which were fulfilled in the 
place or at the time when they were laid down are false in other places or at the 
present time: for the fixed stars which according to the ancients have great 
influence are not now in the position that they were in then and these same 
positions are used in making predictions.60 
 
Oresme claimed that lack of rigor and scientific precision was exactly what made 
astrology such an illegitimate discipline in the first place, since “the rules of astrology are 
based on poetry and rhetoric” rather than on hard, mathematical science.61 Oresme 
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attacked astrology on the grounds that it lacked the mathematical precision necessary to 
determine exactly where the heavenly bodies were at any given time, and this meant that 
astrologers’ “predictions…were variable and discordant.”62 Since “the disposition of the 
heavens cannot be completely known” according to Oresme, then these “fables and 
imaginings…cannot be accepted as a natural science.”63 Without experimental, 
observational, or mathematical proof, Oresme concluded that judicial astrology was not a 
science. The criticism that astrology was too imprecise mathematically to be considered a 
legitimate science became a typical approach to denouncing it up to the time of 
Copernicus.     
 Perhaps the most scathing critique of astrology written during the early modern 
era, and certainly among the most influential throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, was the Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem by the Italian 
humanist philosopher Giovanni Pico della Mirandola.64 While Pico seems to have been 
motivated by his concerns that astrology was an unchristian practice, his attack 
thoroughly covered all of the major arguments against astrology, including a lengthy 
section on its unscientific basis and its lack of mathematical precision. Interestingly, Pico 
approved of magic, which he defined as man’s harnessing the power of the universe, 
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while he deplored astrology because he considered it man’s submission to the will of the 
universe.65 He spent much of his Disputationes differentiating between the two.  
Pico focused his attack primarily on judicial astrology, but he asserted that 
improper definitions for astrology were among its greatest problems. He confined his 
critique to astrology “which foretells things to come by the stars” rather than astronomy, 
which he defined as “the mathematical measurements of the stellar sizes and motion, 
which is an exact and noble art.”66 However, Pico took issue with astrologers because 
they took no heed of these measurements and instead relied on an amorphous set of 
traditions handed down from the time of Ptolemy onward, appropriating countless 
techniques and rules from various versions of Arabic, Persian, Greek, and Babylonian 
astrological traditions, all of which contradicted one another. In addition, he called 
astrologers of his own time “lazy” because they were content to work with “almanacs and 
ephemerides…[and] believe that a planet is at a cardinal point when it is not, or that it is 
not when it is,” instead of observing the heavens for themselves.67 As it was practiced in 
his day, Pico argued, astrology was “the most infectious of all frauds, since...it corrupts 
all philosophy, falsifies medicine, weakens religion, begets or strengthens superstition, 
encourages idolatry, destroys prudence, pollutes morality, defames heaven, and makes 
men unhappy, troubled and uneasy; instead of free, servile, and quite unsuccessful in 
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nearly all their undertakings.”68 Rather than point out these errors of astrology in order to 
generate interest in an astrological reformation, Pico simply used these examples as 
reason to dismiss judicial astrology altogether.  
One particular point that Pico made in the Disputationes that had a great effect on 
observational astronomy and its relationship with judicial astrology regarded the ordering 
of the planets.69 Pico claimed that to be able to determine the particular influence 
individual planets exerted over human beings, knowledge of their proper order was 
paramount. He ridiculed astrologers for their inability to agree on the correct order of the 
planets, particularly Mercury and Venus. Pico quoted Plato, who in his Timaeus placed 
Mercury and Venus beyond the orbit of the sun in the geocentric system, as well as the 
thirteenth-century Arab astronomer Alpetragius, who placed Venus above the orbit of the 
sun while moving Mercury below.70 Ptolemy had placed Mercury and Venus between the 
orbits of the moon and the sun in his geocentric system. Although Ptolemy’s system was 
the most influential, the order of the planets was still the topic of some debate even by the 
late fifteenth century. In any case, Pico argued that because astronomer-astrologers 
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disagreed with one other about the order of the planets, they could not be trusted to 
understand their impact on humanity. It appears that one reader took this criticism to 
heart and was motivated, at least in part, to solve this conundrum—Nicolaus Copernicus.  
 Copernicus’s formal university education began in 1491 at Jagiellonian 
University in Cracow, where he studied the liberal arts, including astronomy. He studied 
there for either three or four years, leaving sometime between 1494 and 1495 without 
taking his degree in order to attend the court of his uncle Lucas Watzenrode. His uncle 
had been recently ennobled and elevated to Bishop of Warmia, and it is possible that 
Copernicus expected to be installed as a canon himself.71 For unknown reasons, 
Copernicus’s attendance at his uncle’s court was delayed, and instead, he furthered his 
schooling by enrolling in the University of Bologna in order to earn his doctorate. While 
ostensibly there to attain a doctorate in canon law, Copernicus continued his studies in 
astronomy and mathematics, and his time at Bologna, from 1496 to 1500, had a 
significant impact on his later astronomical work and informed much of his thinking 
about the positions and movements of the sun, moon, and planets. In Bologna, 
Copernicus lived with his new mentor in astronomy Domenico Maria Novara de Ferrara, 
the primary astronomer for the university and the most notable astrologer in the city, and 
Copernicus became his assistant in making astronomical observations and calculations.72 
According to Copernicus’s later disciple and earliest supporter Georg Joachim Rheticus, 
Copernicus claimed that he was “not so much the pupil” of Novara as he was an 
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“assistant and witness of the observations of Domenicus Maria,” and Copernicus 
respected Novara enough as a scientist to report that he knew his “calculations 
and…observations exactly.”73 It was Novara who introduced Copernicus to Pico della 
Mirandola’s Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem, which had been published 
the year that Copernicus arrived in Bologna.74 
 Although there is little to no evidence to suggest that Copernicus ever practiced 
astrology, it seems almost certain that he was at least aware of its operations and 
techniques, even if he showed no particular interest in it.75 Novara’s position as a 
professor of astronomy at Bologna required that he issue annual astrological predictions, 
typically in the form of a yearly almanac, and that he publish general predictions for 
favorable and ominous dates, calendars marked with the phases of the moon and 
important festival days, and periodic weather reports based on his reading of the 
heavens.76 This was fairly typical of university astronomers in fifteenth- and sixteenth-
century Italy. As Novara’s assistant for three years, it is likely that Copernicus was at 
least exposed to the rules of its practice, and quite possible that he even aided Novara in 
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his duties as Bologna’s primary astrologer. It is certainly true that Copernicus assisted 
Novara in his observations of the heavens, which were accurate enough to fuel his 
growing doubts about the geocentric system.77 Pico’s criticism of astrologers’ inability to 
determine the proper order of the planets apparently affected Copernicus enough that, by 
the time De revolutionibus was published over four decades later, he had devoted an 
entire chapter to setting their order and demonstrating it mathematically within his new 
heliocentric system.78 
In Book One, Chapter Ten, of De revolutionibus, Copernicus argued that the 
simplest method to determine the order of the planets was to base it upon the amount of 
time they required to revolve around the sun. “We see that the ancient philosophers 
wished to take the order of the planets according to the magnitude of their revolutions…” 
Copernicus wrote, and this placed the Moon, which revolves around the earth in twenty-
eight days as the closest heavenly body, and Saturn, which takes nearly thirty years to 
complete its cycle, as the furthest away.79 Under the geocentric system, this meant that 
after the Moon, Mercury was the closest planet to the earth, then Venus, and then the sun, 
which appeared to take one year to return to its original position. However, Copernicus 
noted that Mercury and Venus never deviated from the sun more than twenty-four or 
forty-five angular degrees, respectively, and reasoned that if the geocentric model were 
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true, then we should observe Venus and Mercury beyond these constraints (see figure 1 
below).80 The Ptolemaic system explained this by placing these two planets on epicycles 
and centering their orbits around an imaginary line that extended from the earth to the 
sun. Mercury and Venus then revolved around the earth on their epicycles at the same 
speed as the sun, thus accounting for their apparent lack of further deviation from the sun 
(see figure 2 below).81 Instead, Copernicus posited that if the Sun were assumed to be at 
rest in the center of the cosmos and the earth were assumed to be revolving around the 
sun once every year, then the earth would take a position as the third planet from the sun, 
and the remaining planets would fall into place based on their revolutionary periods. 
After the sphere of the fixed stars, Copernicus positioned 
Saturn, the first of the wandering stars… it completes its circuit in 30 years. After 
it comes Jupiter, moving a 12 year period of revolution. Then Mars, which 
completes a revolution every 2 years. The place fourth in order is occupied by the 
annual revolution in which we said the Earth together with the orbital cycle of the 
Moon as an epicycle is comprehended. In the fifth place Venus, which completes 
its revolution in 7 ½ months. The sixth and final place is occupied by Mercury, 
which completes its revolution in a period of 88 days. In the center of all the rest 
is the sun. For who would place this lamp of a beautiful temple in another or 
better place than this wherefrom it can illuminate everything at the same time?82   
While it is ultimately unknowable exactly why Copernicus developed heliocentrism when 
he did, it is quite possible that Pico’s comprehensive criticism of astrologers’ and 
astronomers’ failure to properly order the planets spurred Copernicus to devise a new 
system that accounted for their apparent motion.83     
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 De revolutionibus, of course, was finally published while Copernicus was on his 
deathbed in 1543. However, the first exposition of the heliocentric theory occurred nearly 
forty years earlier in Copernicus’s Commentariolus of 1514, in which he outlined his 
theory with minimal mathematics in just forty pages.84 This work remained unpublished 
and received little attention because it was meant to be circulated among his colleagues. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the origins of his theory, which finally entered 
public discourse following his death, can be traced all the way back to the first decade of 
the sixteenth century, and it is possible that Copernicus began elaborating on these ideas 
in private as early as 1503, just three years after he left the University of Bologna.85 In 
any case, Copernicus certainly formed the concept by the time he left Italy in 1500, and 
his reevaluation of Ptolemy likely drew on Pico’s criticism of astrology as well as his 
own observations of the heavens with Novara. 
With the publication of De revolutionibus, these new ideas about the structure of 
the cosmos entered the scientific community of mid-sixteenth century Europe. Finally 
convinced by his pupil Rheticus, Copernicus consented to have his magnum opus 
delivered to a printer in Nuremburg, where it received an initial run of about four hundred 
copies.86 From the very beginning, controversy surrounded it, but this controversy 
extended to very few people at first. De revolutionibus was prefaced with a sort of 
religious disclaimer by the Lutheran theologian Andreas Osiander warning that 
Copernicus’s hypotheses “need not be true or even probable” because mathematicians 
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“will adopt whatever suppositions enable the motions [of the planets] to be computed 
correctly from the principles of geometry.” 87 Osiander included this without either 
Copernicus’s or Rheticus’s knowledge. It is possible that Osiander wrote this foreword to 
preempt any criticism from religious figures that heliocentrism contradicted scripture, but 
it is just as likely that he included it in anticipation of the reaction of other 
mathematicians and astronomers, whose Ptolemaic-Aristotelian cosmos was deeply 
shaken by this work.  
In De revolutionibus Copernicus explained heliocentrism in extremely technical 
language with the addition of highly advanced mathematics that would have been 
comprehensible only to other astronomers, mathematicians, and astrologers.88 In a sense, 
the specialized nature of the knowledge Copernicus presented forestalled any substantial 
negative reaction on the part of the public until decades later, and then, only once its 
ideas had penetrated popular consciousness. Understanding the process of this 
dissemination of knowledge across England, which contained one of the most receptive 
scientific audiences, is crucial to understanding the impact of Copernicanism on judicial 
astrology in the early modern courts of the Tudors and the Stuarts.     
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 Figure 1. In the Ptolemaic system, it should be possible to view Mercury and Venus at 180° opposite the 
sun at their perigees (left). Since they never deviate more than 24° and 45°, respectively, Copernicus 
argued against the Ptolemaic cosmos and order of the planet
distances corresponded to maximum possible distances away from the sun that either Mercury or Venus 
could achieve as observed from the earth (right). Based on their orbital period
Venus’s 224 days—Copernicus placed Mercury closer to the sun in his heliocentric system.   
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CHAPTER TWO  
COPERNICANS, SEMI-COPERNICANS, AND MATHEMATICAL COPERNICANS: 
THE ENGLISH REACTION TO HELIOCENTRISM 
 
By modern standards, the process of disseminating Copernicanism across the 
scientific community of Europe was achingly slow. Remarkably few Copernicans existed 
between the publication of De revolutionibus in 1543 and Galileo’s telescopic 
observations of the heavens in the 1609 and 1610. However, though few accepted the 
physical reality of heliocentrism until after Galileo, more accepted its mathematics 
without question. This was a fairly typical position among astronomers and astrologers 
who adopted the Copernican system slowly and often incrementally between the 1570s 
and Galileo’s telescopic observations in 1609.89 How does one define a Copernican? If 
we define a Copernican only as one who definitively accepted the new sun-centered 
system as a physical reality, then only ten existed from the publication of De 
revolutionibus in 1543 to the turn of the seventeenth century.90 However, while only a 
few astronomers and astrologers fully adopted the Copernican system in place of the 
Ptolemaic, many “semi-Copernicans” accepted heliocentrism as mathematically superior 
to the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian system and denied or remained neutral as to its physical 
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validity. In short, there was a wide variety of receptions of Copernicanism often shaped 
by practical, mathematical concerns.  
 Before examining changes in astrological practice, it will be useful to track the 
introduction of the Copernican theory into England in the mid-sixteenth century. Though 
England remained somewhat intellectually isolated from continental Europe, many 
English scholars attended European universities and ideas that circulated in the schools of 
Europe soon found their way across the Channel. Like the continental system, the 
university system in England incorporated some scientific studies—mainly physics and 
mathematics—but its primary concern was Latin grammar in the earlier levels and 
theology and law in the later stages.91 But by the time of Copernicus’s publication of De 
revolutionibus, the royal and noble courts, not the universities, had become the center of 
the most dynamic scientific activity in England.92 It was within this cultural and 
institutional milieu that the heliocentric theory began to take root.      
The first reference to Copernicus in England, thirteen years after the publication 
of De revolutionibus, illustrates this larger setting. In his Castle of Knowledge (1556), an 
elementary arithmetic textbook, the eminent English mathematician Robert Recorde 
briefly considered the question concerning the “quietnes of the earth” and whether or not 
“it chaunceth, that the opinion most generally receiued is not moste true.”93 Recorde 
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attended Oxford in the early 1530s, earned his bachelor’s degree there in 1531, and was 
elected to All Soul’s College later that year to study medicine. Though he obtained a 
license to practice medicine in 1533, it appears that Recorde moved to Oxford to acquire 
a doctorate of medicine in the early 1540s. There is no substantial evidence to prove that 
he taught mathematics while there, but most of his later scholarly works in mathematics 
bore the mark of a man who had gained a pedagogical mastery of the subject.  
Recorde was among the first generation of scholars who began writing in English 
for the practical benefit of the increasingly literate merchant class, and The Castle of 
Knowledge served as a primer for basic Ptolemaic astronomy and arithmetical and 
geometrical astronomy.94 While Latin remained the lingua franca of most scholarly texts, 
the English vernacular witnessed an increase in use due, in part, to the demand for 
beginners’ texts covering practical knowledge like Recorde’s Castle of Knowledge.95 As 
in many of his other works, Recorde composed The Castle of Knowledge as a dialogue 
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between a master and a student. The master first claims that he “neede not to spende anye 
tyme in proouing” the immobility and centrality of the earth since “that opinion is so 
firmelye fixed in most mennes headdes, that they accompt it mere madnes to bring the 
question in doubt.”96 However, to demonstrate that the geocentric model was not as 
impervious to criticism as a neophyte mathematics student might assume, Recorde’s 
master invoked several ancient authorities who argued against it, including “not only 
Eraclides, Ponticus, a great Philosopher, and two great clerkes of the Pythagoras schole, 
Philolaus and Ecphantus…but also Nicias Syracusius, and Aristarchus Samius, [who] 
seem with strong arguments to approoue” the heliocentric theory.97 The appeal to ancient 
authority was, of course, a common technique among early modern writers who desired 
to imbue their work with scholarly credibility, and Recorde included Copernicus as the 
last in a line of natural philosophers, describing him as “a man of greate learning, of 
muche experience, and of wondrefull diligence in obseruation,” who “renewed the 
opinion of Aristarchus Samius, and affirmeth that the earthe not only moveth circularly 
about his owne centre, but also may be, and yea is, continually out of the precise centre of 
the world…”98  
Despite his concision, Recorde treated the heliocentric cosmos as a valid 
alternative, and the brevity of the allusion can be attributed to the rudimentary nature of 
the textbook. Understanding the implications of the theory and the anticipated reception 
among skeptical contemporary scholars, the student in Recorde’s dialogue reacted 
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incredulously: “Nay syr in good faith, I desire not to heare such vaine phantasies, so farre 
againste common reason, and repugnante to the consente of all the learned multitude of 
Wryters, and therefore let it pass forever, and a day longer,” to which the master replied, 
You are too yonge to be a good iudge in so great a matter: it passeth farre from 
your learninge, and theirs also that are muche better learned than you, to improue 
his supposition by good arguments, and therefore you are best to condemne 
nothing that you do not well vnderstand but another time, as I sayd, I will so 
declare his supposition, that you shall not only wonder to hear it, but also 
peraduenture be as earnest then to credite it, as you are to condemne it.”99  
This caveat against condemning a hypothesis before one fully understands its particulars 
implies that Recorde was well aware that the last word on Copernicus had not yet been 
written.  In this spirit, Recorde claimed that “the reasons” for Copernicus’s theory “are 
too difficult for this Introduction,” and so he “omit[ted] them for another time…because 
the understanding of that controversy dependeth on profounder knowledge than in this 
Introduction may be uttered conveniently….”100 Unfortunately, Recorde died two years 
later without expounding upon Copernicus again.  
The next mention of Copernicus in England came later in 1556 in John Dee’s 
preface to John Feild’s Ephemeris. John Dee, often described as a magus, truly deserves 
the appellation “Renaissance man.” During his lifetime, he was involved in nearly all 
major intellectual pursuits within the domain of natural philosophy, including astrology. 
Showing great promise as a young grammar school student, Dee eventually attended St. 
John’s College, Cambridge, and Louvain University in Flanders where he studied under 
the prominent mathematicians Gemma Frisius and Gerard Mercator from 1548 to 
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1550.101 It is possible that he first became acquainted with the theory of Copernicus via 
Frisius while at Louvain. In any case, after lecturing on mathematics in France for a year, 
he returned to England in 1551 and began serving first in the court of the Earl of 
Pembroke and then the Duke of Northumberland.102   
The acquaintanceship between John Dee and John Feild evidently began while 
both were serving prison terms. Dee, a partisan of the future Queen Elizabeth I, had been 
imprisoned along with Feild in 1555 for their alleged astrological prognostication of the 
fate of Queen Mary. Dee’s charge was for the “lewde and vayne practices of calculing 
and conjuring,” which was considered more serious during Mary’s reign than it would be 
accounted later in the Elizabethan era.103 Following her ascension to the throne, Queen 
Mary feared the use of prophecy, which often accompanied rumors of rebellion. Several 
predictions concerning Mary’s death circled about London in 1554, and it seems that she 
took no chances with Dee or Feild.104 While imprisoned, Dee suggested that Feild model 
his new planetary tables on the Prutenic tables, which were based on the observations and 
calculations of Copernicus. Feild agreed and enlisted Dee to write the preface to his 
work. 
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Feild’s Ephemeris was an English version of the Prutenic tables, themselves based 
on Copernicus’s heliocentric model. The original Prutenic tables had been published by 
Erasmus Reinhold five years earlier in 1551, but they specified the location of the stars 
and planets at given times based on the location of Prussia. Feild’s Ephemeris used the 
same data to recalculate the tables based on the position of the stars relative to London 
time.105 Dee was described by a contemporary as “a most ardent defender of the new 
hypothesis and Ptolemaic doctrine.”106 His views on the physical reality of heliocentrism 
remain enigmatic. On the one hand, every mention of the theory in his writings is 
positive. On the other hand, he described the cosmos in Aristotelian and Ptolemaic terms 
at length in his later works, the Propaedeumata aphoristica and the Monas 
hieroglyphica.107 At the very least, it seems that Dee, like many of his mathematically 
knowledgeable contemporaries, recognized the advantages that the Copernican theory 
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provided for calculating the positions of the planets while perhaps not accepting it as a 
physical or metaphysical reality.108  
 In his preface to Feild’s Ephemeris, Dee was clearly more concerned with the 
mathematical precision of Copernicus than with the physical basis of his claims.109 He 
extolled the “more than Herculean efforts” of Copernicus to “restore the heavenly 
discipline” to its proper stature following the steady accretion of errors since the time of 
Ptolemy. However, after praising his “radiant brilliance” and “divine studies,” Dee 
contended that the preface to Feild’s work was not the proper place to discuss the import 
of such a hypothesis.110 Given the limited space at his disposal, Dee may merely have 
meant that a longer work would be necessary to discuss heliocentrism more fruitfully, but 
his commendation of Copernicus in the preface of a work on planetary tables suggests 
that the context of his praise, in this instance, was mathematical rather than physical. This 
conscious differentiation is, in one sense, curious for Dee since his Hermetic, 
Neoplatonic, and occult dispositions remained fully integrated with mathematical, 
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astronomical, and empirical modes of thinking throughout his life.111 However, while 
Dee regarded mathematics highly, he saw them merely as a means, and a subservient one 
at that, to philosophical truth. For Dee, astronomical mathematics was but one of many 
paths to knowledge about natural philosophy, and when it contradicted deeper truths 
about the nature of the cosmos derived from ancient Hermetic texts, Dee accorded 
mathematics a status secondary to the metaphysical.112     
Feild, on the other hand, may not have separated his cosmological philosophy 
from his mathematical understanding of the cosmos.113 Feild’s reference to Copernicus is 
even briefer than Dee’s, though his adulation is no less glowing. He asserted that his 
planetary tables were constructed “following the authority” of both Copernicus and 
Reinhold “whose solid writings are founded on true, certain, and sincere 
demonstrations.”114 However, while Feild used the Copernican system and the tables of 
Reinhold to calculate the positions of the planets, he wrote no other work accepting the 
heliocentric theory, and it is unclear from his writings whether by “demonstrations” he 
meant mathematical or observational since both could be employed for the construction 
of tables. Given his consultation of Reinhold’s tables, however, it seems likely that Feild 
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referred to Copernican mathematics. In either case, the uses of the strong words “true 
[and] certain” exhibit clear approval of Copernicus.   
 The first English scholar to unquestionably adopt the Copernican theory as a 
physical reality and to substitute it for the Ptolemaic system was Thomas Digges. Digges 
received no formal university education, but his father, the respected mathematician 
Leonard Digges, personally instructed him in mathematics and astronomy when he was 
child. In 1554, when Thomas was only eight years old, Leonard Digges participated in 
Thomas Wyatt’s unsuccessful rebellion against the newly crowned Queen Mary and was 
sentenced to death for his role in the insurrection. Though he avoided execution, his 
property was confiscated and he spent five years attempting to regain his estates before 
dying a poor man in 1559. The guardianship of Thomas passed to John Dee who acted 
both as his surrogate father and mathematics mentor until Digges reached adulthood five 
years later.115 Under Dee’s tutelage, Digges flourished as one of the best English 
mathematicians of the 1570s and 1580s.  
 During these decades, several celestial events turned the eyes of England’s 
astronomers and astrologers to the heavens, and Digges’s careful observations of these 
events led him to rely on the Copernican system as essential to interpreting their positions 
and motions. The first event was a supernova that appeared in the sky in early November 
in 1572. Digges believed that by measuring the parallax of the new supernova, he could 
determine whether the earth or the sphere of the fixed stars rotated once a day. In a short 
treatise on the nova, Alae seu scalae mathematica, published early the next year, Digges 
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wrote that the new star offered an opportunity “for proving whether the motion of the 
earth set forth in the Copernican theory is the sole reason why this star is apparently 
diminishing in magnitude; for if it were thus always decreasing toward the spring 
equinox, it would be observed to be very small in its own magnitude.” By this method, 
Digges continued, 
it would not be at all difficult if this remarkable Phenomenon [the supernova] 
should persist for a long time, to discern by exact judgment whether the earth lies 
quiet and immoveable in the center of the World, and whether that huge mass of 
moving and fixed Orbs rotates in a circle by a most rapid course in the space of 24 
hours, or rather, that that immense sphere of fixed stars remains truly fixed and 
that apparent motions occurs only from the circular rotation of the Earth with 
reference to the celestial poles themselves. 116 
  
Digges’s observational experiment was subjected to great criticism by Tycho Brahe in his 
Astronomiae Instauratae Progymnasmata. Brahe argued that Digges only took into 
account the diurnal motion of the earth and not its annual motion about the sun in his 
calculations. Furthermore, a high degree of parallax would have placed the supernova 
close to the earth; the fact that this was not observed placed it far beyond the orbit of 
Saturn. Brahe asserted that if Copernicus was right, the supernova would be much too far 
away from the earth for its location and apparent magnitude to be affected by the earth’s 
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position. While Digges seems not to have realized that the diurnal parallax would have 
appeared the same relative to his position on the earth whether the earth moved against a 
backdrop of stationary stars or whether the firmament wheeled about an immobile and 
centrally located earth, his adherence to observation as the arbiter of knowledge about the 
Copernican theory shows that he was concerned with detailed collection of data. 
Moreover, Digges intended to use this data not merely to better calculate the positions of 
the planets but to describe the physical nature of the cosmos.117 
 The second celestial event to cause astronomers and astrologers to question the 
conventional wisdom regarding Ptolemaic mathematics and the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian 
cosmological structure was the Great Comet of 1577, which was observed and recorded 
by numerous astronomers across Europe including not only Thomas Digges, but also 
Michael Maestlin and Tycho Brahe.118 Unlike the supernova of 1572, which in reality 
was much too far away for any discernible parallax, the comet’s close approach to the 
earth allowed the most keen observers of celestial phenomena to determine within a 
reasonable degree of precision the comet’s distance from the earth. The consensus among 
those who had begun to doubt the efficacy of the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian cosmos was that 
it was impossible for the comet to lie below the sphere of the moon, as all Aristotelians 
accepted.119 Aristotelians believed in the incorruptibility of cosmos beyond the moon’s 
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orbit and had attributed all observable change in the heavens to have taken place below 
the sphere of the moon.120  
As several observers noticed, however, if the comet were below the orbit of the 
moon, it would have a high degree of parallax when in fact none was observed. For 
example, Johannes Kepler, who was only six years old at the time of the comet, wrote 
much later in his Mysterium Cosmographicum (1595) that his tutor Maestlin “showed me 
a…reason [in support of Copernicus] by another special argument: he found that the 
Comet of the year ’77 moved constantly with respect to the motion of Venus professed 
by Copernicus; and he conjectured from this superlunary height that [the Comet] 
completed its orbit in the same orb as the Copernican Venus,” clearly placing it beyond 
the sphere of the moon.121 Similarly, in his treatise on the use of the astrolabe 
Astrolabium vranicum generale (1596), John Blagrave wrote that “our late learned 
countryman, Master Digges is his Scala Mathematica found, because he had no Parallax, 
that the [comet] must needes be beyond the Spheere of the ☽.”122 Although this 
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observation itself did not deliver a mortal blow to Ptolemaic-Aristotelian cosmology, it 
did demolish the idea that the heavens above the moon were necessarily perfect and 
unchangeable and that the planets were carried about by crystalline spheres, since the 
comet would be required to pass through them. At the very least, it offered more 
ammunition to those who believed that the Ptolemaic system required more than merely 
revision.  
Thomas Digges’s Alae seu scalae mathematica was written in Latin and 
addressed to an international audience, but his next exposition of the Copernican theory 
three years later was intended for the English masses. Beginning in 1553, Digges’s father 
published an almanac entitled A Prognostication Everlastinge of Right Goode Effecte, 
which contained information on weather prediction and the positions of the stars and 
planets. Leonard Digges published two more editions in 1554 and 1556 before his 
premature death at age 39 in 1559. Thomas Digges began publishing a revised version in 
1576, in which he used Copernican “geometricall demonstrantion[s]” to correct the errors 
that had accumulated in his father’s calculations to show “a perfit description of the 
caelestiall orbes according to the most auncient doctrine of the Pythagoreans, lately 
revived by Copernicus.”123 Even though he thought of heliocentrism as a physical reality, 
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Digges still appealed to Copernicus’s mathematical demonstrations in order to make his 
case:  
But in this age, one rare wit (seeing the continual errors that from time to time 
more & more have been discovered, besides the infinite absurdities in their 
Theorickes, which they have been forced to admit that would not confess mobility 
in the ball of the earth) hath by long study, painful practice, and rare invention 
delivered a new Theoricke or model of the world, shewing that the earth resteth 
not in the Center of the whole world…124 
Digges viewed the constant, miniscule mathematical adjustments made by those 
attempting to preserve the Ptolemaic model as “absurd” and concluded that that entire 
enterprise was misguided.   
Furthermore, in Digges’s philosophy, fixity implied a certain degree of nobility, 
and the motion of the earth relegated it to what he regarded as its rightful place as a 
location of sin and degradation. By moving the earth from its central location, Digges 
dethroned the earth, so to speak, and the ignobility and baseness of the earth was revealed 
by its reduced importance as a planet that orbited  
only in the Center of this our mortal world or Globe of elements, which environed 
and enclosed in the Moon’s Orb, and together with the whole globe of mortality is 
carried yearly round about the Sun…[and] in respect of the immensity of that 
immovable heaven, we may easily consider what little portion of God’s frame our 
Elementary corruptible world is, but never sufficiently be able to admire the 
immensity of the Rest.125 
Digges envisioned the cosmos as an infinite kingdom, in which the sun ruled “like a king 
in the middest of all” from the center of the solar system, which was its own “Celestiall 
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temple.”126 The idea of the sun in a central position of authority better harmonized with 
the metaphysical cosmos as Digges understood it. 
Finally, though his arguments rested mostly on mathematical demonstrations, 
Digges specifically rejected the notion that the Copernican theory was merely a 
mathematical hypothesis designed to “save the phenomenon” of perfectly circular orbits. 
Digges forcefully asserted that Copernicus “meant not, as some have fondly excused him, 
to deliver these grounds on the earth’s mobility only as Mathematical principles, feigned 
& not as Philosophical truly averred” but rather intended his theory to represent a 
physical reality.127 Indeed, he had written in the marginalia on the title page of his own 
copy of Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus that “the common opinion errs.”128 
After Digges’s unequivocal exposition of the Copernican theory, the 
astronomical, astrological, and mathematical writers of the last quarter of the sixteenth 
century typically took note of heliocentrism in their works regardless of whether they 
accepted or rejected it. Certainly by the 1570s, it had become notable enough within these 
circles to require some comment. For example, Thomas Blundeville, a well-respected 
mathematician, logician, and Christian humanist was among the first in England to argue 
against the Copernican theory on theological grounds, but he couched this within larger 
arguments about its scientific legitimacy. Still, as an accomplished mathematician, 
Blundeville recognized the computational advantages to the Copernican theory and only 
cautioned his readers not to confuse mathematical simplification with physical reality. In 
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his Exercises of 1594, an eclectic mixture of introductory material on arithmetic, 
navigation, cartography, and the use of the astrolabe, Blundeville wrote of heliocentrism 
that     
some also deny that the earth is in the middest of the world, and some affirme that 
it is mouable, as also Copernicus by way of supposition, and not for that he 
thought so in deede: who affirmeth that the earth turneth about, and that the sunne 
standeth still in the midst of the heauens, by help of which false superstition he 
hath made truer demonstrations of the motions and reuolutions of the celestiall 
Spheares than euer were made before as plainly appeareth in his booke de 
Reuolutionibus dedicated to Paulus Tertias the pope, in the year of our Lord 
1536.129 
 
Despite deriving more precise mathematical positions for the planets from what he 
considered a superstitious physical hypothesis, Blundeville understood the importance of 
its mathematical implications. Like many of his contemporaries, Blundeville approached 
Copernicanism cautiously and accepted it piecemeal—appropriating the less 
controversial aspects while denying others. 
Unlike Digges, Blundeville refused to entertain the idea that the earth actually 
moved and was most adamant in this respect, deferring to both the authority of classical 
philosophers as well as scripture: 
But Ptolemie, Aristotle, and all the other olde writers affirm the earth to be in the 
middest and to remain imooueable and to be in the very Center of the world, 
proouing the same with many most strong reasons not needful here to be 
rehearsed, because I think fewe or none do doubt thereof, and especially the holy 
Scripture affirming the foundations of the earth to be layd so sure that it neuer 
should mooue at any time: Again you shall find in the self same Psalme these 
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words, Hee appointeth the Moone for certain seasons, and the sunne knoweth his 
going downe, whereby it appeareth that the sunne mooueth and not the earth.130 
 
Somewhat ironically, eight years later in his Theoriques of the Seven Planets, Blundeville 
named the German astronomer Michael Maestlin, a Copernican, as his chief astronomical 
influence for planetary calculations. Theoriques—usually referred to as theorica—were 
traditional astronomical textbooks dating back to the twelfth century similar to 
ephemerides like John Feild’s Ephemeris anni 1557. However, rather than simply 
providing tables with values for determining the positions of heavenly bodies at given 
times and places, theorica typically included the specific calculations one needed to 
master in order to predict these positions oneself.131  Blundeville, following the 
mathematical models of Maestlin, which were themselves derived from Copernicus, 
wrote in the introduction to his Theoriques that  
I thought I could not shew myself more thankfull vnto them [the court of the Earl 
of Leicester] than by setting forth the Theoriques of the planets, which I have 
collected, partly out of Ptolemy, and partly out of Puerbachius, and of his 
commentator Reinhold, also out of Copernicus, but mostly out of Mestelyn, 
whom I have chiefly followed because his method and order of writing greatly 
contenteth my humor.132 
 
Maestlin taught traditional Ptolemaic astronomy at the University of Tübingen, but he 
adhered fully to heliocentrism in his research and writing by at least the 1590s, even if he 
                                                          
130
 Blundeville, His Exercises, sig. 181r.  
131
 Katherine A. Tredwell, “Theorica Planetarum,” in Medieval Science, Technology, and Medicine: An 
Encyclopedia, ed. Thomas Glick, Steven John Livesey, and Faith Wallace (New York: Routledge, 2005), 
474-5. The first of these textbooks was written in early thirteenth century by Gerard of Sabloneta, often 
confused with the earlier translator Gerard of Cremona. The most famous and most widely used theorica 
throughout the Later Middle Ages up to the sixteenth century was John of Sacrobosco’s Tractatus Sphaera 
of ca. 1230.   
132
 Thomas Blundeville, The Theorique of the Seven Planets (London: Phillip Islip, 1602), sig. Aiiir. 
http://eebo.chadwyck.com.echo.louisville.edu/search/full_rec?SOURCE=pgimages.cfg&ACTION=ByID&
ID=99852660&FILE=../session/1303969554_14395&SEARCHSCREEN=CITATIONS&VID=17994&PA
GENO=3&ZOOM=50&VIEWPORT=&SEARCHCONFIG=var_spell.cfg&DISPLAY=AUTHOR&HIGH
LIGHT_KEYWORD=undefined. (accessed 28 April 2011). 
58 
 
was reticent to publish any polemics against Ptolemaic astronomy.133 Blundeville’s 
invocation of him, along with other luminaries of the astronomical canon, demonstrates 
not only his reliance on numerous historical astronomers for his calculations but also his 
ability to accept Copernican mathematics without accepting its physical reality. 
 The final important figure in the reception of Copernicanism in England before 
the 1610s was Thomas Harriot. Harriot was remarkable yet enigmatic figure in the 
history of science. Called “the English Galileo” by his most authoritative biographer John 
W. Shirley, Harriot became most famous for his telescopic observations of the contours 
of the moon’s surface and sunspots, which he called “frost & a mist [on] the sonne” some 
four months prior to the same discoveries by Galileo.134 However, Harriot’s precarious 
position at court during the first decade of the seventeenth century, which we shall 
examine in more detail in the next chapter, made it difficult for him to achieve any 
recognition for his scientific works during his lifetime.  
Harriot’s role in the reception of Copernicanism in England was at once important 
and negligible—it was important in that he was the last major figure to fully support 
Copernicanism before Galileo’s observations provided, for the first time, physical 
evidence for Copernicanism, and because Harriot’s own observations helped convince 
him of heliocentrism. However, he attained only marginal scientific status and exerted 
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little influence over other scholars because he was an intensely private and timid scholar 
after his brief incarceration in the Tower of London in 1605.135 Harriot remained 
relatively obscure because he published only one work during his lifetime, A Briefe and 
True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia. This ethnographic description of the 
Algonquian people and language, which he made during his 1585-6 voyage to the coast 
of modern-day Virginia and North Carolina, contained no indication of his astronomical 
or mathematical beliefs despite the fact that these pursuits were his primary professional 
concern.136 His only other published work was the Artis Analyticae Praxis, which came 
ten years after his death, and it contained no insight into his opinion on Copernicanism.  
 The main clues to Harriot’s acceptance of the heliocentric theory came in the 
letters he exchanged with several other scientists, including, most notably, Johannes 
Kepler. However, Harriot’s correspondence with his pupil Sir William Lower revealed 
the most about his opinions on astronomy. Unfortunately, all of Harriot’s letters to Lower 
have disappeared, but nine letters from Lower to Harriot remain, and they present a 
picture of Harriot as highly knowledgeable in mathematics, optics, and observational 
astronomy but reserved in his demeanor and uninterested in the kind of glory-seeking that 
often typified upwardly mobile courtiers during this time period.137 Lower rarely 
mentioned Copernicus himself, and instead, most of the references that shed light on 
Harriot’s attitude toward the heliocentric theory occurred as discussions of the various 
observational details that supported this viewpoint. Lower, who professed to Harriot that 
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he was “wholly possessed with astronomical speculations and desires,” received an early 
telescope from Harriot in 1610 and immediately recognized how essential it would 
become to astronomy in the future.138 Following Harriot’s instructions, Lower used a 
telescope to observe the details of moon’s surface. “I have received the perspective 
cylinder [telescope] that you promised me,” Lower wrote to Harriot,  
[and] according as you wished I have observed the moon in all its changes. In the 
new I manifestly discover the earth shine, a little before the Dichotomy, that spot 
which represents unto me the Man in the Moon (but without a head) is first to be 
seen. A little after near the brim of the gibbous parts toward the upper corner 
appear luminous parts like stars but much brighter than the rest and the whole 
brim along, looks like unto the Description of the Coasts in the Dutch book of 
voyages…I must confess I can see none of it without my cylinder.139   
 
By observing features on the surface of the moon, both Harriot and Galileo disproved the 
Aristotelian notion that heavenly bodies were perfectly spherical. Just as Galileo 
emphasized the telescope as an essential scientific instrument in the Medici court in 
Tuscany, Harriot employed it to make simultaneous observational discoveries in England.  
Though direct references to Copernicus were scant in these exchanges, Lower 
complained of those who spoke “slightly of Copernicus” without understanding him, and 
he defended Kepler, who had criticized the French mathematician François Viète for his 
constant “mend[ing] of things in…Copernicus,” signifying that he, and presumably 
Harriot, concurred with Copernicus in general terms.140 The principal concern of Harriot 
and Lower, however, seems to have been the removal of the last vestiges of 
Aristotelianism in the Copernican system. The observations of Galileo, Harriot, and 
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others had undermined the notion of the perfection of the superlunar sphere and the idea 
that the planets were carried about in their orbits by invisible, solid crystalline spheres. 
Now, along with Kepler, who Lower claimed to have “read diligently” at the behest of 
Harriot, they were attempting to remove the final Aristotelian axiom of the perfectly 
circular motion of the planetary orbits.141 Harriot and Lower had both obviously read 
Kepler’s recently published Astronomia Nova, which offered the first observational 
evidence for the elliptical orbit of the planets, and Lower wrote to Harriot that “about his 
theory [elliptical orbits]… methinks (although I cannot yet overmaster many of his 
particulars) he established soundly and as you say overthrow the circular astronomy.”142 
With Kepler’s discovery of the elliptical orbits of the planets, the final remnants of the 
Ptolemaic and Aristotelian cosmos had been disproved. This opened the door for a new 
kind of physics and a new kind of empiricism, both of which affected the practice of 
judicial astrology. 
The reception of Copernicanism in England was a slow process that went through 
several phases. From its first appearance in print as an intriguing mathematical novelty in 
1556 to its first unqualified acceptance as a physical reality by Digges in 1576 to its 
acceptance based on observational evidence by Harriot in the 1610s, astronomers and 
astrologers reacted to Copernicanism in a variety of ways. While it did not immediately 
undermine the Ptolemaic-Aristotelian system, its mathematical solutions to the problem 
of how to precisely predict planetary movements could not be ignored by any 
knowledgeable astronomer or astrologer by the end of the seventeenth century. Few 
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accepted it as a physical reality at first, but many “semi-Copernicans” accepted its 
mathematical description of the cosmos without question. In England, the largely 
practical, utilitarian concerns of patrons and their client-scientists meant that as long as 
Copernican mathematics provided more precise planetary positions, the heliocentric 
theory would grow in influence.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
COPERNICANISM AND ASTROLOGY IN SIXTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND:  
PATRONAGE AND PRACTICALITY 
 
 By the time Copernicanism gained a foothold in England, judicial astrologers had 
become fragmented into many distinct camps including philosophical conservatives, 
mathematical reformers, and popular prognosticators.143 The conservatives maintained a 
version of astrology based on a wide range of astrological traditions and were not 
particularly interested in mathematical precision. Among these astrologers who practiced 
judicial astrology in the way it had been conducted since ancient times, Copernican 
mathematics made little headway.144 Among conservative astrologers less interested in 
mathematics or less adept in the precision necessary for utilitarian astrology, the impact 
of occult philosophies such as Neoplatonism and Hermeticism held greater sway and they 
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practiced astrology based on divination or magic.145 The new cosmology and 
mathematics of Copernicus had little effect on how they understood the fundamentals of 
astrology, and these astrologers generally wrote books of commentary or theory on the 
subject of judicial astrology instead of practicing everyday prognostication.146 Popular 
astrologers, sometimes referred to as “vulgar astrologers” by their elite detractors, were 
typically not scientists, and their prognostications came in the form of non-mathematical, 
usually non-technical almanacs.147 However, during the sixteenth century, conservative 
and popular astrologers practiced mainly outside the utilitarian patronage system of 
Tudor and Stuart England. Astrological reformers took the criticisms of writers like Pico 
della Mirandola to heart and sought to establish judicial astrology as a precise, 
mathematical science. The practical concerns of English patrons ensured that these 
mathematical reformers flourished at court, where client-scientists’ interests in 
mathematical precision paralleled their patrons’ insistence on scientific proof.148      
Conservative astrologers rarely commented on the scientific debate between 
Ptolemaic and Copernican theories. Typical of the conservative position on astrology, for 
                                                          
145
 Ibid. 
146
 Ibid., 99-104. 
147
 H. Darrell Rutkin, “Astrology,” in The Cambridge History of Science: Early Modern Science, Vol. 3, 
ed. Katherine Park and Lorraine Datson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 553. In the 
sixteenth century, almanacs had been quite technical and often showed examples of the mathematical 
techniques employed in determining the positions of the planets or in the casting of horoscopes. 
Throughout the mid to late seventeenth century, however, almanacs dropped most of their mathematical 
demonstrations. The only exception seems to have been in the science of navigation, and mathematical 
demonstrations in that field seem to have increased in popular works throughout the period. See also 
Bernard Capp, English Almanacs, 1500-1800: Astrology and the Popular Press (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1979), 199-201; and Chapter 4 below for more details.  
148
 I have used the term “client-scientist” throughout this work to refer to scientists patronized by the 
nobility who derived their main source of income or secured funding for their research through their 
patrons. Most historians of patronage refer to these individuals simply as “clients” and their relationship as 
“patron-client.” To avoid confusion related to the modern meaning of the term “client,” which implies that 
a service is being performed for them rather than by them, I have used the somewhat cumbersome, but 
more precise term, “client-scientist.”      
65 
 
example, was the Italian theologian and astrologer Tommaso Campanella, who wrote that 
“whether the sun moves or stands still, it is to be supposed a moving planet by us, 
considering the matter from our senses and our description; for the same happens whether 
it moves or the earth.”149 Campanella, like many other astrologers more interested in the 
metaphysical, emphasized that it was only the relative position of the stars in sky and 
their relationship with the individual for whom a horoscope was cast that mattered. 
Similarly, in England, the great astrological defender Sir Christopher Heydon, in his 
Defence of Iudiciall Astrologie, argued that “whether (as Copernicus saith) the earth be 
not the centre of the world, the astrologer careth not,” because astrology was consistent 
with both geocentric and heliocentric models of the cosmos.150  
While this was true on a theoretical level, it was not necessarily true on a practical 
level because knowledge of the precise locations of the planets coincided better with the 
interests of nobles whose patronage those reform-minded astrologers required. Therefore, 
those who wished to curry favor of potential patrons emphasized this precision.151 
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Typical of the astrological reformers was the Dutch polymath Gemma Frisius, whose 
very early realization of the impact of Copernicanism on astrology is telling. Two years 
prior to Copernicus’s death and the publication of his De revolutionibus in 1543, Frisius 
received a copy of Georg Joachim Rheticus’s Narratio Prima, the first printed exposition 
of the heliocentric theory. Frisius, a student of medicine at the University of Louvain, 
immediately recognized the utility of the theory and expected that its application would 
remedy the mathematical inaccuracies of Ptolemaic astrology. In the summer of 1541, he 
wrote to John Dantiscus, the bishop of Ermland, lamenting that “many errors, veils, and 
many labyrinths…many puzzles more difficult than the Sphinx have enveloped our 
astrology,” and he believed heliocentrism was the key to unraveling them.152 Among the 
dilemmas he supposed new astronomical tables based on Copernican mathematics would 
solve, Frisius specified 
the motion of Mars, which I have often found to differ by three elliptical degrees 
from even the most exact calculation with astronomical tables. Or the size of the 
Moon, which does not vary as much before our eyes as the most reputable authors 
of this art maintain. The length of the year has never been determined in perfect 
accordance with the truth… The motion of the firmament and the apogees, which, 
not even resembling a slight resemblance to the truth, is ridiculed by all. I also 
leave aside several other things on the longitude and latitude of nearly all the 
fixed stars… If that author [Rheticus] would mend and buttress these 
matters…wouldn’t it amount to giving us a new earth, a new heaven, and a new 
world?153  
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Frisius’s assessment of the problems plaguing contemporary astrology depended heavily 
on a detailed knowledge of observational and mathematical astronomy, and he seemed 
keenly aware that any meaningful reform in astrology would hinge upon the increased 
precision of observational astronomy. With the coming of Copernicus’s longer work two 
years later, Gemma Frisius, and other astrologers, got their wish. For Frisius, De 
revolutionibus was a key mathematical resource for the better prediction of the position 
of the stars and planets. For those who were beginning to regard the precision of 
planetary positions as the primary characteristic of a legitimate astrology, this work, and 
the tables derived from it, provided a significantly more accurate basis for mathematical 
calculations concerning these locations. From the very beginnings of Copernican 
astronomy, its relevance for astrological prediction was apparent for those who chose to 
utilize it.  
Meanwhile, in England, once the Copernican theory had taken root, astrologers 
recognized that its mathematics could be employed to benefit judicial astrology. For 
example, in 1583 Thomas Heath wrote a treatise on judicial astrology in order to correct 
the errors of a previous work by Richard Harvey, whom Heath regarded as a poor 
astrologer because he lacked the mathematics necessary to make the proper calculations. 
Despite his work’s pessimistic tone, Heath was not anti-astrological. Rather, he urged 
people not to lose faith in astrology because of the mathematical errors of a few, and he 
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referred to those not familiar with “Copernicus’…[h]ypotheses, Reinholt’s observations, 
or Puerbachius’ [tables]” as “simple Astrologians.”154 Harvey’s work became popular 
because it predicted terrible events for the year 1588, when a conjunction of Jupiter and 
Saturn was to occur. According to contemporary chronicler Raphael Holinshed, much of 
the populace of England had reached a point of near hysteria with talk of the prediction 
“rife in everie mans mouth.”155  
Thomas Heath assuaged the fears of the English by claiming that Harvey made 
erroneous predictions based on bad data. He criticized Harvey for employing out-of-date 
tables for his calculations and for failing to understand the observable motion of the 
planets. “It is well known,” chastised Heath, that Harvey “followed the Alfonsine 
account, which at this day is long since found (by the best learned) to halt, prooved 
insufficient, exactly to account any apparent motion.”156 For those astrologers who kept 
abreast of the latest mathematical tables, the consultation of the Alfonsine tables for 
planetary positions would have immediately indicated to the mathematically educated 
astrologer the inadequacy of a work. The Prutenic tables had largely replaced the 
Alfonsine table by the 1580s, and because Harvey had used these for all of his planetary 
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positions, his calculations were off by more than fifteen hours. According to Heath, this 
created what “needs be a greate alteration in iudgement” and because of the discrepancy, 
Heath predicted that the conjunction was benign rather than malevolent.157 Heath 
admonished Harvey for his lack of precision and instructed that “not only to the degree 
and minute [of arc] is requisite but also the second, where at any time the coniunction 
may happen,” reminding his fearful audience that even seemingly minor errors could 
create wildly different predictions.158  
The satirist and notable astrological skeptic Thomas Nashe was much less 
forgiving in his treatment of Harvey in particular and credulous commoners more 
generally. In his 1589 pamphlet Anatomy of Absurdity, Nashe ridiculed those who 
interpreted every stellar event as a cause for alarm, writing that “no star [Harvey] seeth in 
the night but seemeth a Comet; he lighteth no sooner on the quagmire, but he thinketh 
this is the foretold earthquake… Thus are the ignorant deluded, the simple misused, and 
the sacred Science of Astronomy discredited.”159 Nashe considered astrologers like 
Harvey reckless and sensationalist and he implied that Harvey had taken advantage of 
people’s fears to sell his work. For Nashe, the fact that so many had prophesied doom for 
the year 1588 and this had not come to pass was proof that “the distemperature of the 
stars,” as he put it, was nothing more than a fiction.160 In another pamphlet published 
three years later, Nashe referred to Harvey as a “ridiculous Ass” and recommended that 
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any astrologer whose predictions turned out to be manifestly false should be shunned by 
the profession and never heeded again: 
What expectation there was in both town and country , the amazement of those 
times may testify: and the rather because he pawned his credit upon it, in these 
express terms: “If these things fall not out in every point as I have wrote, let me 
forever hereafter lose my credit in Astronomy.” Well, it so happened that he 
happened not be a man of his word; his Astronomy broke that day with his 
creditors, and Saturn and Jupiter proved honester men than all the World took 
them for.161 
 
Furthermore, the year 1588 was witness, not to cataclysm, but to one of the most decisive 
English military victories of the century with the defeat of the Spanish Armada, and this 
damaged the reputation of astrologers who had predicted terrible events for the year. 
Indeed, the reputation of Richard Harvey and those associated with him declined 
throughout the 1590s.162   
 Despite the increased attention to results in the realm of astrological prediction, 
Harvey was able to retain some degree of respectability in England due in large part to 
the patronage of the Bishop of London. This was fairly typical of astrologers in the 
sixteenth century. In England, astrologers appropriated this information primarily in ways 
that suited the needs of their patrons. Nearly all members of the higher nobility in 
sixteenth-century England employed astrologers at their courts, and the astrologers’ 
duties typically involved observing the sky or more often consulting with mathematical 
tables and making prognostications based on this information. Because the sixteenth 
century witnessed not only a consolidation of the centralized state under the powerful 
Tudor family but also the economic expansion of England overseas, the nobility became 
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increasingly aware of the need for well-educated scholars, highly qualified to utilize 
various branches of knowledge in service of their interests. Frequently, the same 
individuals involved in surveying and mapping a lord’s estate or designing the 
fortifications for a castle were also using the similar mathematical techniques of astrology 
to prognosticate the future.163  
Many of the most illustrious courtiers of the Elizabethan era displayed an eager 
interest in the knowledge of astrology. Robert Dudley, the Earl of Leicester, employed 
two astrologers personally—one as his physician, another specifically for the casting of 
horoscopes—and it was at his request that John Dee determined the most auspicious 
moment for the coronation of Elizabeth I in 1558. William Cecil, Lord Burghley, 
evidently kept a notebook detailing astrological predictions, and Henry Percy, Earl of 
Northumberland, cultivated a circle of client-scientists rich in practicing astrologers who 
were knowledgeable in the mathematics necessary to precisely predict planetary 
locations.164 Puritan theologian Laurence Humphrey exaggerated little when he remarked 
in 1563 that most among the nobility “ravened, embraced, and devoured” the science.165 
Since reformist astrologers focused on the precise mathematical basis necessary for 
prediction, patrons’ utilitarian interests led them to employ more reform-minded, 
mathematical practitioners. For example, in his capacity as a medical practitioner, Robert 
Recorde served as a court physician to both the young King Edward VI, to whom he 
dedicated several books, and his successor Queen Mary, to whom he dedicated The 
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Castle of Knowledge.166 Recorde’s treatment of both astrology and astronomy in this 
work exemplified the concatenation of these two fields of study in the mid-sixteenth 
century and the significance of mathematics for the study of both.  
Though wholly astronomical and mathematical in content, as we have seen, The 
Castle of Knowledge contained a preface insinuating that the entire enterprise of 
mathematical astronomy was important in the first place because that knowledge gave 
men control over the impact of the stars: 
So was there never anye greate chaunge in the worlde, nother translations of 
Imperies, nother scarse falle of anye princes, nor dearthe and penurye, no death 
and mortalitie, but GOD by the signes of heaven did premonish men therof, to 
repent and beware betyme, if they had any grace. The examples are infinite, and 
all histories so full of them, that I thinke it needles to make any rehearsall of them 
more; especially seeyng thei appertain to the Iudiciall part of Astronomy, rather 
than to this part of the motions, yet shall it not be preiudiciall… But who that can 
skyll of their natures, and coniecture rightlye, to affect them and their 
menacynges, shall be able not only to avoide many inconveniences, but also to 
achieve many unlikelye attemptes, and in conclusion be a governoure and rulare 
of the stars…167 
Like many other early modern scholars sympathetic to astrology, Recorde was eager to 
refute any charges of determinism that often accompanied the practice of astrology.168 
Far from succumbing to power of the stars, astrologers often believed that greater 
knowledge of the movement of the stars allowed men greater control over their 
destinies—precisely the type of practical control patrons coveted. Just as the practical 
knowledge of mathematics provided control over the earth through the arts of navigation 
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and cartography, so too could it provide mastery, rather than subservience, to the power 
of the stars over human affairs.  
 Thomas Digges left fewer clues regarding his specific opinion on astrology, 
though it seems very likely that he had cast some horoscopes and given his opinion on the 
meaning of stellar events, such as the 1572 supernova and 1577 comet. Both of Digges’s 
principal patrons—William Cecil, Lord Burghley and Robert Dudley, the Earl of 
Leicester—were interested in astrological prognostication. In the 1570s, Digges offered 
both Burghley and Leicester “astronomical manuscripts” for the purposes of better 
practicing astrology.169 In a lost manuscript dedicated to Lord Burghley, Digges had 
included multiple tables designed to determine the positions of the stars and planets in 
relation to the horizon, meridian, sun and moon. In the treatise, Digges evidently included 
“sundry conclusions both pleasant for variety of knowledge and necessary for common 
use” in which he rendered conclusions for “Histories poetical and Judgements 
astronomical.”170 It is unclear whether, by “Judgements,” he meant astrological 
predictions or definitive information on their positions in the sky, but given Burghley’s 
obvious interest in mathematical astrology, it is likely that this referred to both.171 In a 
letter to Lord Burghley, Digges claimed he had “waded as far as ancient grounds of 
astrology would bear him to sift out the unknown influences of this new star or comet,” 
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and he would “[s]end notes of observation and prediction” at a later time.172 Given his 
views on heliocentrism, it also seems likely that he used Copernican tables for the 
purposes of these predictions. 
In the one explicit mention of astrology in his work expounding upon 
Copernicanism, Digges claimed that “sundry Astrologians finding the alterations in the 
declination and Longitude of stars, have thought that the same also should have his 
motion peculiar,” by which Digges meant that there existed a discrepancy between the 
way that stars attached to a solid crystalline sphere should move, and the way they do 
move because of the changing position of the earth in its orbit. “Yet Copernicus,” Digges 
continued, “by the motions of the Earth, solveth all, and utterly cutteth off the ninth and 
tenth spheres, which contrary to all sense, the maintainers of the earth’s stability have 
been forced to imagine.”173 In the Ptolemaic system, the eighth sphere was that of the 
fixed stars, the ninth sphere was called the primum mobile (prime mover), and it existed 
to keep the stars in motion, and the tenth sphere was the “Emyrean realm” of God and the 
angels. Copernicus removed the ninth and tenth spheres from his physical description of 
the cosmos, but maintained the sphere of fixed stars at the very edge.174 In any case, 
Digges was clearly interested in both the Copernican conception of the cosmos as well as 
the fact that its mathematics provided astronomer-astrologers with more precise positions 
of planets.  
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 Among the earliest English astrologers to utilize Copernican mathematics 
specifically in service of his patron was the mathematician John Blagrave. One of 
Blagrave’s principal patrons was Charles Howard, the first earl of Nottingham and Lord 
High Admiral of the English fleet, which he had commanded at the defeat of the Spanish 
Armada in 1588. One of the wealthiest and most powerful men at both Elizabeth I and 
James I’s courts, Howard patronized a number of scientists and literati throughout his 
lifetime.175 In the dedication to his 1596 study of the astrolabe, Blagrave personally 
thanked Howard for “taking a personal interest in [his] personal preference” by which he 
meant his acceptance of the Copernican theory.176 Blagrave had mentioned 
Copernicanism as early as 1585, in an earlier text on the mathematics of using an 
astrolabe, The Mathematical Iewel, in which he acknowledged the complexities and 
inadequacies of the Ptolemaic system, but did not fully commit to the Copernican system 
as better or more accurate, writing that 
Insomuch that the late yeares that singular man Copernicus affirmeth that the 
sunne is the fixed centre of the world, about whom the earth moueth (not the 
sunne about the earth) and that all the rest of the planets moue regularly about the 
center of the sunne sauing the moone which like an epicicle moueth about the 
earth in a spheere of the earth 13 times in his yearley motion. But omitting the 
inuentions of Copernicus, and a number of the rest, I will only heere shew a figure 
of those which haue always bene before his time…177   
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This was the only mention of Copernicus in the text, and Blagrave employed Ptolemaic 
mathematics and traditional terminology to refer to the cosmos throughout. Still, even at 
this early stage, Blagrave appears to have recognized the mathematical advantages of the 
Copernican system.  
His next foray into Copernican theory came specifically within the context of 
judicial astrology, and it appears as though Blagrave was among the reformers who 
recognized the advantages of tables based on Copernican mathematics. He desired to 
“skillfully acquaint” astrologers “with all the planets, starres, and constellacions of the 
heauens…in which, agreeable to the hipothesis of Nicolaus Copernicus, the starry 
firmament is appointed perpetually fixed and the earth and his horizons continually 
mouing from west towards the east once about euery 24 houres.”178 In the treatise, 
Blagrave intended to improve the precision of the astrolabe, a device instrumental in 
determining the positions of the heavenly bodies, and provide “all such necessary 
supplements for iudiciall astrology, as Alkabitius & Claudius Dariottus haue deliuered by 
their tables.”179 With more precise instrumentation and the Copernican model, Blagrave 
used this to his observational advantage, noting that “…withall being a thynge [astrolabe] 
most commonly in use, and differing in nothing, but that they according to the auncient 
Astronomers, appointed the Starry Heavens to move rightwards from East towards West, 
uppon the earth or fixed horizon of the place.”180 An astrolabe measured the movement of 
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the stars across the sky, which has an apparent east to west motion caused by the daily 
rotation of the earth in the opposite direction. Although this effect remains the same 
whether the earth rotates eastward or the fixed stars rotate westward, Blagrave 
emphasized that the Copernican theory accounted for this movement just as precisely, 
observing that  
according to Copernicus cause the earth on the horizon to moue leftward from 
West toward East , uppon the Starry firmament fixed…In which motion (a pretty 
thing to note) one that standeth by shall hardly perceiue any other but that the 
Rete mooueth although indeede you turne about the Pater, strongly confirming the 
Copernicus Argument, who sayeth that the weakenesse of the senses do imagine 
the Heavens to mooue about every 24 houres from East to West by a Primum 
Mobile, whereas indeed they have been alwayes fixed and it is the earth that 
whirleth about euery 24 houres from West to East, of his own proper nature 
allotted unto him, as is most for the receptacle of all transitory things, being 
appointed in a place where nothing is to stay him from his continuall 
moouing…181 
 
By comparing the rotation of the earth with the similar motion of rete across the surface 
of the astrolabe, Blagrave argued for the physical imperceptibility of the Copernican 
theory. And his references to both Copernicus and judicial astrologers suggest that he 
regarded the two as compatible.  
 The examples of Digges and Blagrave illustrate the control patrons exerted over 
their client-scientists’ astrological works, and if a patron’s interest in a topic diminished, 
they simply ended their support. The drastic shift in Digges’s intellectual interests and 
writings from the 1570s to the 1580s, for example, exemplifies the influence a patron’s 
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interests had over where a client-scientist’s focus would ultimately lie. In the early 1570s, 
Digges’s principal patron had been Lord Burghley but this ended for unknown reasons in 
1576.182 During his time at Burghley’s court, Digges’s writings concentrated on detailed 
analyses of stellar events, which, while they had practical implications for horoscopic 
prognostication, apparently did little to contribute to the wealth of Burghley. From 1578 
on, Digges became a highly favored client-scientist of Leicester. Though Leicester 
accepted astrological prognostication as a legitimate scientific enterprise, he showed less 
interest in the mathematical astronomy Digges viewed as necessary for such an endeavor. 
After 1578, with the exception of revised editions of his father’s Prognostication 
Everlastinge, Digges published no more on the topic of astronomy or astrology.183 
Instead, under Leicester, Digges used his knowledge of mathematics to compose military 
treatises on the most effective ways to deploy artillery in battle, on the ballistics of 
cannonballs and musket shots, and on the provisioning of armies.184 The reasons for this, 
as Digges himself wrote in the preface to Straticos, his first military work while in the 
service of Leicester, entailed his devotion to the English state and crown:  
Even so, albeit the strange varietie of intentions in the more subtile part of the 
Mathematicall Demonstrations did breede in me for a time a singular delectation, 
yet finding none, or very few, with whom to confer or communicate those my 
delights (and also remembering the grave sentence of the divine Plato, that we are 
not born for ourselves, but also for our parents, country, and friends), after I grew 
to years of riper judgment I have wholly  bent myself to reduce those imaginative 
contemplations to sensible practical conclusions of those my delectable studies, as 
also to be able, when time is, to employ them to the service of my prince and 
country.185 
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Digges suggested that he had moved on to more practical matters for the necessity of the 
state and that the more theoretical mathematics with which he had engaged in his younger 
years now benefitted him as he put his knowledge to a use deemed more practical by his 
patron. Interestingly, Digges considered mathematical astronomy, and not necessarily 
astrology, the “imaginative contemplation” he had renounced. As service to the state in 
the form of his patron superseded his personal interests, Digges redefined practicality to 
exclude his earlier work on planetary positions and Copernicanism.    
 Similarly, John Blagrave, whose works extolling the Copernican theory had once 
attracted the attention of several notable courtiers, encountered financial difficulties that 
curtailed his scientific activity. Blagrave, a man of very limited means, was required to 
seek out new patrons as his current ones lost interest in his practices. Blagrave had 
cultivated contacts with a large and diverse body of patrons from the 1580s to the 1600s, 
deriving support from the aforementioned Charles Howard, as well as the influential 
William Cecil, Lord Burghley, and the Member of Parliament Sir Francis Knollys.186 
Unfortunately, Knollys died in 1596 and Burghley in 1598. Blagrave wrote regretfully 
that “time hath bereft me of all my most Honourable Favourers,” and, just two years 
before his death in 1611, he nurtured his relationship with his final patron, James I’s 
privy counselor Sir Thomas Parry, through flattery: “…and only your Honour now 
succeeding your Honourable Father in place of honour, is the principall hope left unto 
me, who in my Mathematick… [infancy] both favoured me, and furnished me out of your 
admirable and generall library, of such mathematickes books, as in those daies were 
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hardly or not elsewhere to be gotten.”187 Blagrave’s adulation of Parry likely represented 
not only an attempt curry favor with a potential financial resource but also a genuine 
expression of gratitude since Blagrave required the generosity of a noble like Parry in 
order to accomplish his scientific work. Blagrave dedicated all of his published works to 
his patrons, and in doing so, he conformed to the pattern of many client-scientists who 
hoped to maintain good relations at court. However, as patrons lost interest in 
mathematical astrology throughout the early to mid seventeenth century, their financial 
support for client-scientists specializing in this field waned as well.       
 Although patronage remained, broadly speaking, the center of the most advanced 
scientific activity during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, some notable 
changes occurred within the system. Henry VIII had self-consciously modeled his own 
court on the culturally refined courts of Renaissance Italy.188 Throughout the sixteenth 
century, the writers, philosophers, and scientists at those courts had successfully 
enhanced the cultural prestige of their patrons through their writings and scientific 
research, and Henry VIII hoped to emulate this on a national scale in England. By the 
time of the reign of Elizabeth, as we have seen, the courts had become the center of 
scientific activity in England. Her long reign, though it had its turbulence, provided a 
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high degree of stability for the patronization of client-scientists and a relatively open 
environment for the exchange of scientific ideas.189 With the coming of the Stuart 
dynasty in 1603, this began to change. While lines of scientific communication remained 
open and mostly unobstructed, James I sought more centralization of the court system 
and exerted a greater level of personal control over what he deemed to be the acceptable 
and unacceptable practice of science.             
 King James I’s attitude toward astrology was complex but he defined it best in his 
own scholarly work Daemonologie, published in 1597. James was an accomplished 
scholar in his own right, particularly regarding matters of political theory and statecraft, 
and Daemonologie examined the legal issues concerning magic, witchcraft, and other 
occult phenomena. While the main topic of this work was to prove “that such deuilish 
artes haue bene and are” a reality and to determine “what exact trial and seuere 
punishment they merit,” the text contained a definition of astrology, an explanation of its 
relationship with astronomy, and how to distinguish between the two.190 Like most 
scholars of his era, James I discerned between the two concepts of natural and judicial 
astrology, making explicit references to both the Bible and commonly accepted 
etymology. But he also was among the first to specifically differentiate between 
astronomy and astrology—using the original Greek terminology for the words, 
astronomia and astrologia—and to consider natural astrology as a category separate from 
astronomy. He defined astronomy as “the law of the Starres” and claimed that it was “not 
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onelie lawful but necessarie and commendable” because it was a legitimate science based 
on mathematics.191 He defined astrology as the “preaching of the Starres” and delineated 
the natural branch as “knowing thereby the powers of simples, and sickenesses, the 
course of the seasons and the weather, being ruled by their influence; which part 
depending vpon the former [Astronomie], although it be not of it selfe a parte of 
Mathematicques: yet it is not vnlawful, being moderatlie vsed.”192According to James I, 
natural astrology was a perfectly acceptable practice, though it should not be considered a 
branch of mathematics. Rather, natural astrology was a non-mathematical art that merely 
relied on the more technical aspects of astronomy.  
His treatment of judicial astrology, however, was much less conciliatory. To 
follow judicial astrology was       
to truste so much to their influences, as thereby to fore-tell what common-weales 
shall florish or decay: what, persones shall be fortunate or vnfortunate: what side 
shall winne in anie battell: What man shall obteine victorie at singular combate: 
What way, and of what age shall men die: What horse shall winne at matche-
running…Of this roote springs innumerable branches; such as the knowledge of 
the natiuities, the Cheiromancie, Geomancie, Hydromancie, Arithmancie, 
Physiogmnomie, & a thousand others. This parte now is vtterlie vnlawful to be 
trusted in, or practized amongst christians, as leaning to no ground of natural 
reason…in the Prophet Ieremie it is plainelie forbidden, to beleeue or hearken 
vnto them that Prophecies & fore-speakes by the course of the Planets & 
Starres.193 
 
In this interpretation, James was not so far removed from the tradition of the astrological 
skeptics who argued that astrology was acceptable provided that it did not contravene 
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free will. However, by dividing natural astrology from astronomy, James allowed an 
outlet for both a form of astronomy and astrology to be practiced. By singling out the 
aspects of astrology that he rejected, he was able to relocate the mathematical practice to 
astronomy and redefine legitimate astrology as an art form separate from and dependent 
upon the more scientific practice of astronomy.  
In terms of its impact on the court patronage system, James I’s attitude toward 
astrology had surprisingly little effect. After James ascended to the English throne in 
1603, the nature of the court changed in several ways. New nobles from his native 
Scotland joined the court, often at the expense of the previous Elizabethan ones; the 
amount of money funneled into client-scientists actually saw a sharp increase; the court 
became even more centralized than it had been under either Henry VIII or Elizabeth I; 
and it took on a more scholarly, professional tone.194 At first, based on his rhetoric from 
Daemonologie, James seemed to clearly imply that his financial support would extend to 
astronomy and not to astrology, indicating how separable these two disciplines were 
perceived to be by the early seventeenth century. Indeed, several astrologers encountered 
legal trouble under the reign of the first Stuart monarch. As early as 1581, during the 
reign of Elizabeth I, Parliament had passed laws making it illegal to cast horoscopes for 
royalty without their permission, and there is evidence that both Robert Cecil, the Earl of 
Salisbury, and James’s son Prince Henry of Wales had banished or imprisoned 
astrologers for breaking this law.195 Furthermore, both Henry Percy, the Earl of 
Northumberland, and his favorite client-scientist Thomas Harriot were imprisoned under 
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James I, in part, because of their illicit use of judicial astrology. Nevertheless, throughout 
James I’s twenty-two year reign, he patronized a number of notable astrologers or active 
supporters of astrology, including Robert Pont, James Maxwell, and John Napier. Pont 
was a numerologist and an active supporter of judicial astrology and Napier, best known 
as the first mathematician to use logarithms, was a disciple of judicial astrology.196 James 
I was also a patron and defender of the greatly influential mathematical astrologer and 
physician Robert Fludd, whose works were among the most widely-read in England in 
the 1610s and 1620s.197 Provided that they remain within their legal bounds, James, like 
his predecessors, allowed astrologers to continue to practice throughout his reign.    
Following his ascension to the throne in 1603, James I brought with him from 
Scotland a whole new coterie of noblemen. Most client-scientists who had established 
good professional relationships with patrons under Queen Elizabeth I continued to find 
support among Jacobean nobles. However, with the addition of James’s entourage from 
Scotland, many courtiers from Elizabeth’s reign were replaced in important positions at 
the new monarch’s court. Most retained their estates and titles but ceased to serve in any 
governmental positions for the first Stuart king. In fact, only Robert Cecil, the Earl of 
Salisbury, one of Elizabeth’s favorites, remained directly attached to James’s court, and 
he retained essentially his entire retinue of client-scientists.198 Other client-scientists 
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faced the decision of remaining with their principal patrons, where they could continue to 
practice science without any direct royal support, or whether to pursue connections with 
new nobles. Many chose the latter path.         
The court of James I even garnered something of an international reputation in 
science, particularly because of its utilitarian atmosphere and also because of James’s 
staunch Protestantism. For instance, Johannes Kepler originally hoped to use Jacobean 
England as a home base for his studies because he viewed King James as the European 
monarch most capable of uniting the Protestant world and healing the rifts between 
Protestants and Catholics.199 Kepler dedicated his De Stella Nova of 1606 to James I, and 
in 1619 he intended to dedicate his Harmonices Mundi, which detailed his theory of the 
harmonic relationship between geometrical ratios and the physically observed heavens, to 
James I, but the European political situation made it unsafe for him to do so.200 However, 
Kepler noted that he hoped his work on celestial harmony would attract the attention of 
James I, whose hope for “harmony and unity” among Protestants “in the ecclesiastical 
and political spheres” reflected Kepler’s belief in the natural harmony of the celestial 
spheres.201 Kepler, who also practiced astrology, believed that James could be persuaded 
that with the right scientific and mathematical reform, judicial astrology was as valid a 
science as any.202 He originally hoped to accomplish this on English soil but ultimately 
turned down overtures from Henry Wotton, the English ambassador to the court of Holy 
Roman emperor Frederick II in Vienna, for personal reasons in favor of remaining in 
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German lands because he “love[d] the mainland, and fear[ed] the closeness of an 
island.”203 But it was the Protestant religion and the intellectual openness that drew him 
to the court of James I.   
Many mathematical astronomers who also regularly practiced astrology, such as 
Johannes Kepler, consciously and categorically separated themselves from non-
mathematical astrologers. Kepler’s attitudes toward astrology were complicated, but 
given his scientific influence in England and his attempted connections with the Jacobean 
court, his positions are important. While he was a practicing astrologer, Kepler was also 
critical of many of the contradictory rules of traditional astrology, and he was clearly 
influenced by the criticisms of Pico della Mirandola. Like many of his English 
counterparts, Kepler regarded a more appropriate application of mathematics as the key 
to discovering what was valid, scientific astrology, and what was mere superstition. In 
this respect, Kepler called true astrology the “step-daughter of astronomy” and popular 
prophecies which relied on no mathematical sciences as “dreadful superstitions.”204 In De 
Stella Nova, Kepler remarked that “a mind accustomed to mathematical deduction, when 
confronted with the faulty foundations of astrology, resists a long, long time, like an 
obstinate mule, until compelled by beating and curses to put its foot into that dirty 
puddle.”205  
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By accepting astrology as scientifically valid, Kepler assumed that he had no 
choice but to apply his mathematical knowledge to the “dirty puddle” of astrology, thus 
saving it from its own deficiencies. In a letter to his former mathematics professor 
Michael Maestlin, in which he ridiculed what he considered both Catholic and 
astrological superstition, Kepler explained that he proceeded “as the Jesuits do, who 
correct much in order to make men Catholic. Or rather, I do not act so, for those who 
defend all the nonsense are like the Jesuits. I am a Lutheran astrologer, who abandons the 
nonsense and keeps the kernel.”206 Kepler recognized that astrology required serious 
reform if it were to be regarded as a legitimate science, but he maintained an overall 
belief that the heavens exerted some influence over the lives of individual humans. It was 
evident that Kepler relied on the advances in mathematical astronomy to support his 
reform: 
But if I now speak of the outcome of my studies, what, may I ask, do I find far off 
in heaven that even remotely refers to it? No inconsiderable part of science, 
according to the experts, have been either freshly constructed by me, or corrected, 
or completely finished. But in this regard, my stars were not Mercury rising in the 
corner of the seventh house 90 degrees from Mars, but Copernicus and Tycho 
Brahe. Without the latter’s volumes of observations everything which has now 
been brought to me in the clearest light would lie buried in darkness.207  
Even as Kepler researched the mathematics of the motions of the heavenly spheres, and 
in the process developed what he is best-known for—the three laws of planetary motion, 
which disproved Aristotle’s perfectly circular spheres—he used much of this knowledge 
to create a more mathematically precise astrology. 
                                                          
206
 Letter from Johannes Kepler to Michael Maestlin, 15 March 1598, in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 13, 184, 
quoted in Bowden, The Scientific Revolution in Astrology, 108. 
207
 Johannes Kepler, Harmonices Mundi, in Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 6, 280-5, quoted in Edward Rosen, 
“Kepler: Astrology and Mysticism,” in Occult and Renaissance Mentalities, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), 267.  
88 
 
Among the most notable new courtiers under James I was his own eldest son 
Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales, the heir-apparent to the English throne. Though only 
ten years old at his father’s coronation, Henry proved a precocious youth interested in 
traditional chivalric sports such as hunting, but he also seemed eager to apply himself to 
academics.208 King James insisted that Henry’s education should be the ultimate focus of 
the court, and this facilitated a great convergence of many of the most learned men in 
England. According to one of Henry’s tutors Sir Thomas Chaloner, James ordered that 
Henry’s household “should rather imitate a college than a court” and that “His Highness’ 
household...was intended by the King for a courtly college or a collegiate court.”209 
Similarly, Timothy Bright, a client-scientist who remained attached to the household of 
the Earl of Salisbury following James’s ascension, described life at the Jacobean court as 
“akin to a university.”210  
Henry’s father initially assembled the court for him, but by his early teen years, 
Henry began amassing many of his own client-scientists, particularly those with scientific 
knowledge in military matters and geography. One notable member was Edward Wright, 
one of the most accomplished geographers of the early seventeenth century who became 
Henry’s mathematics and cosmography tutor. For Henry’s education in astronomical 
mathematics, Wright designed  
a large sphere…for his Highness, by the help of some German workmen; which 
sphere by means of spring-work not only represented the whole motion of the 
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celestial sphere, but shewed likewise the particular systems of the Sun and Moon, 
and their circular motions, together with their places, and possibilities of eclipsing 
each other. In it was a work by wheel and pinion, for a motion of 171000 years, if 
the sphere could be kept so long in motion.211 
Wright was involved in both theoretical scientific pursuits as well as practical—his work 
Certaine Errors in Navigation explained the mathematical basis for the Mercator 
cartographic projection for the first time, but he also spent much of his time designing 
mathematical instruments, such as Henry’s celestial sphere. Henry’s penchant for 
patronizing practical, mathematical sciences in particular arose from a developing notion 
of English patriotism as England began to take its place on the international stage, both 
on the continent and in overseas colonies, during the early seventeenth century. Much as 
previous noble patrons of the sixteenth century had emphasized pragmatic scientific 
knowledge as a way to advance their careers and increase their wealth, James I and his 
son Henry applied this to a national scale, hoping to use the same type of knowledge to 
benefit the state as a whole against its European enemies.212 Like many earlier patrons, 
Henry hoped to make the “more esoteric studies of astronomy and mathematics” more 
accessible and more useful to the English in service of their country.213          
Much as Thomas Digges’s and John Blagrave’s experiences with patrons 
exemplified the control a patron’s interests exerted over what their client-scientists 
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studied, the example of Thomas Harriot epitomizes how the changing fortunes of patrons 
had correlative effects on their client-scientists. Harriot attended Oxford from 1577 to 
1580, and immediately upon his graduation he became attached to the court of Sir Walter 
Raleigh, then a favorite courtier of Elizabeth I, as his mathematics tutor.214 Raleigh 
employed Harriot in a variety of capacities as a mathematician, but Harriot’s most 
important role in the Raleigh household was as principal advisor for Raleigh’s overseas 
ventures. Navigation was the greatest common interest between Harriot and Raleigh, and 
Harriot brought his extensive knowledge of mathematics to bear on practical issues 
regarding navigation, ship design, and the financial management of Raleigh’s burgeoning 
colonial enterprises.215 Under Raleigh’s patronage, Harriot made a voyage to the coasts of 
present-day Virginia and North Carolina in 1585-6, where he acted as navigator for 
Raleigh’s captains, surveyed and mapped the lands they encountered, and acted as a 
liaison between the English explorers and the Algonquians they met.216 Harriot had 
learned at least some of the Algonquian language while in London through contact with 
two Algonquians living there—Manteo and Wanchese—and he translated for the English 
and transcribed much of the language during the voyage.217 The expedition resulted in 
brief fame for Harriot after the publication of his Briefe and True Report of the New 
Found Land of Virginia, the only work published during his lifetime, which detailed the 
geography and material resources of coastal Virginia and gave general descriptions of the 
lifestyle and customs of the native Algonquians. Dedicated to Raleigh, this work 
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essentially served as propaganda for Raleigh’s own efforts to secure funding for his 
colonial ambitions, and with Raleigh’s fortunes on the rise throughout the 1580s, 
Harriot’s own star rose as well.218 The fact that Harriot’s Briefe and True Report 
remained his only published work reflects how utilitarian Raleigh’s patronage was and 
mirrors the experiences of Digges and Blagrave.  
By the late 1580s, Harriot had cultivated a new patronage contact with one of 
Raleigh’s associate courtiers Henry Percy, the Earl of Northumberland. Northumberland 
began as an outsider to the Elizabethan court. Though he was a Protestant, he came from 
a Catholic family near the border with Scotland, a fact that would later briefly put him in 
the good graces of James I, but under Elizabeth, he was always at risk of being suspect 
for his religious and national affiliations.219 Northumberland had great interest in the 
“mathematical magic” of astronomy and astrology, and during the last two decades of the 
sixteenth century, he assembled a court of scholars well-versed in many related sciences. 
The courtier circles of Raleigh and Northumberland overlapped with many client-
scientists, including Harriot, who received his main income from Northumberland by the 
early 1590s.220 Northumberland, often known as “the wizard earl” because of his 
enthusiastic interest in astrology, alchemy, and scientific experimentation, patronized 
some of the most accomplished and well-known scientists and natural philosophers of the 
1590s, including the mathematicians Robert Hues and Walter Warner, who, along with 
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Harriot, were sometimes referred to as Northumberland’s “three Magi.”221 
Northumberland’s interest in astrology can also easily be ascertained from the books that 
his client-scientists dedicated to him. Of the three that survive, two—Auger Ferrier’s 
Learned Astronomical Discourse, of the Iudgement of Nativities (1593) and John Ford’s 
The Golden Mean…Discoursing of the Nobleness of Perfect Virtue in Extreames 
(1614)—were about astrology and numerology, respectively.222 While Harriot’s interests 
gravitated toward the practical while he was in the employ of Raleigh, they moved in the 
direction of theoretical speculation once Northumberland became his chief patron. 
During the 1590s and 1600s, Harriot’s fate became inextricably tied to these two 
patrons, and their successive disgraces marred his otherwise successful scientific career. 
In 1591, Sir Walter Raleigh secretly married Elizabeth Throckmorton, one of Queen 
Elizabeth’s ladies-in-waiting, without the queen’s permission, and when the queen 
discovered this, she had Raleigh arrested and Throckmorton dismissed from her court.223 
Raleigh was briefly imprisoned in the Tower of London for these missteps and it took 
him several years to regain his courtly prestige and the support of Elizabeth. With 
Elizabeth’s death and the ascension of James I, Raleigh’s fortunes, and thus Harriot’s, 
quickly took a downward turn. Less than a year into James’s reign, in November 1603, 
Raleigh was once again arrested, this time for his connection to individuals involved in 
the Main Plot against the new king. This plot was concocted by several English Catholics 
who hoped to remove James from the throne and replace him with his Spanish cousin 
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Arbella Stuart, briefly considered a contender for the English throne during Elizabeth’s 
last years.224 Although Raleigh had no direct involvement in the plot, his close 
association with two people who were involved led to accusations of treason. He was 
found guilty, but his sentence of execution was commuted by James I, and Raleigh was 
imprisoned in the Tower once more, this time until 1616. His release was short-lived 
though, and after an expedition to Venezuela in which he harassed coastal Spanish forts, 
the Spanish ambassador to England successfully convinced James I to reinstate the death 
penalty. Raleigh was beheaded in 1618.225  
Harriot’s other patron fell out of favor with the Jacobean court for similar reasons. 
Sir Thomas Percy, a Catholic and cousin of the Earl of Northumberland, participated in 
the more notable Gunpowder Plot against King James on 5 November, 1605. After the 
plot was uncovered and thwarted shortly before being carried out, Percy fled London 
before being tracked down and killed by a marksman five days later.226 Much like 
Raleigh’s situation two years earlier, Northumberland had no direct involvement in the 
plot, but he was suspected of a having a connection to it through his cousin. He was fined 
£30,000 and imprisoned in the Tower of London for seventeen years.227  
At the time of Northumberland’s incarceration, Harriot relied almost entirely on 
Northumberland for his financial well-being and Northumberland’s fall resulted in 
momentary disaster for Harriot. He was arrested as well, had his house and all his 
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scientific papers searched for wrongdoing, and was suspected by royal authorities of 
having cast James I’s horoscope for Northumberland.228 Harriot addressed James’s Privy 
Council to plead his innocence, claiming that he “was never any busy medler in matters 
of state…never ambitious for preferments…but contented with a private life for the love 
of learning that [he] might study freely.”229 Harriot was released after a short stay in the 
Tower and he got his wish to “study freely,” though unfortunately for him, this meant 
that he was severed from both his patrons and reduced to an annual pension of £100. He 
never published again, never developed any new relationships with any other potential 
patrons, and spent the remainder of his years quietly carrying out research in Copernican 
astronomy, atomic theories of matter, and theories of light.230 A year after his release 
from the Tower, Harriot carried on a correspondence with Johannes Kepler, who wrote 
that he had been “informed that misfortune came to you from astrology. I ask you if you 
believe that it could be powerful enough to have such power.”231 It is unclear whether, by 
astrology, Kepler meant Harriot’s practice of astrology or the stars’ ill-effects on him.  
Harriot’s marginal status as an English scientific figure who exerted virtually no 
influence over the scientific community after 1605 directly reflected the marginal status 
of his patrons. Unlike most other courtier patrons of the Elizabethan and Jacobean eras, 
Northumberland seems to have been mostly uninterested in the practical scientific 
concerns that many of peers considered paramount. After moving from Raleigh to 
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Northumberland in the 1590s, almost all of Harriot’s scientific interests revolved around 
theoretical matters as well, including astrology. Northumberland’s ostentatious patronage 
style put him out of step with the largely utilitarian style of his fellow courtiers, and 
Harriot’s negligible influence among scientists was likely among the consequences of 
this fact. 
In the sixteenth century, practical concerns motivated English astronomer-
astrologers to adopt Copernican mathematics to solve problems of planetary positions 
that the Ptolemaic system could not. These same motives caused them to use this 
mathematics in service of astrology. The interests of client-scientists typically aligned 
with those of their patrons, and so long as patrons demonstrated a utilitarian interest in 
mathematical, scientific astrology, then their client-scientists practiced this form of 
astrology by using the most innovative, precise mathematics. During the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries, these were the ephemerides, star charts, and calculations 
derived from Copernicus. However, the status of these client-scientists remained directly 
linked to that of their patrons, and if patrons lost interest in mathematical astrology—as 
happed to Digges and Blagrave—then financial support slowly vanished from these 
endeavors. If patrons ran afoul of authorities—such as Raleigh and Northumberland—
then their client-scientists were forced to seek support elsewhere or withdraw entirely 
from active scientific research. However, as courts ceased to be the center of scientific 
activity throughout the middle of the seventeenth century, astrology moved to other 
institutional arenas that wanted something different from astrology and changed based on 
the needs of these new institutions.    
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CHAPTER FOUR  
REDEFINGING ASTROLOGY IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY:  
UNIVERSITIES, ALMANACS, AND JACOBEAN PATRONAGE 
 
During the Jacobean era, the dominant location for scientific research and writing, 
including astrology, had been the royal court and the satellite courts of the nobility. 
However, during the mid-seventeenth century, the courts ceased to be the center of 
scientific activity, including mathematical astrology. Therefore, astrologers moved to 
other institutional venues and sought funding in different ways. The seventeenth century 
also witnessed a sharp increase in literacy, particularly among the rising merchant 
classes, and an explosion in astrological almanacs, pamphlets, and calendars, many of 
which relied less on claims to scientific legitimacy and more on the ability to appeal to a 
wider public. As astrology gained esteem among the popular classes, it began to wane in 
influence among the scientific community, particularly following the Civil War and the 
creation of the Royal Society in 1660. Astrology became re-categorized and redefined as 
something other than a science by the very group of English scientists who, for more than 
a century, had supported it. The mathematical practice of astrology disappeared, in part, 
because mathematicians no longer wished to associate with a field that increasingly 
sought mass appeal partially on the basis of excluding technical, mathematical detail. For 
decades, astrology had been rejected primarily on moral or religious grounds and 
critiqued scientifically by those who believed in it and wished to reform it. Beginning in 
the mid-seventeenth century, it was rejected for scientific reasons.  
97 
 
As we have seen, this dismissal of astrology had little to do with the impact of 
Copernicanism but had much more to do with how scientists attempted to define their 
practice and where they received their support. As patrons ceased to support astrologers 
in the numbers seen in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, astrologers were 
forced to find new institutional settings within which to operate. Thus, while astrology 
gained in popularity among the popular classes through almanacs and pamphlets, the 
English scientific community consciously distanced itself from practicing astrologers as 
science simultaneously became a more professionalized discipline.    
 Although the courts were the locus of major scientific activity in the early 
seventeenth century, many of the client-scientists patronized by the nation’s nobility had 
attended university and had become well-versed in the traditional curriculum of Latin 
grammar and rhetoric, mathematics, and Aristotelian physics and astronomy. Although 
universities remained highly traditional establishments offering programs in the seven 
liberal arts, they still served as the primary training ground for young scholars eventually 
hoping to become attached to the courts. While a university education had been desirable 
but not required in the early sixteenth century, by the seventeenth century it became 
essential for inclusion in royal courts. A university education not only carried cultural and 
intellectual prestige but also prepared future client-scientists for scientific research at 
court. For example, a clear majority of practicing client-scientists at the court of Prince 
Henry, James I’s son, held university degrees, and the more technical their interests, the 
more likely they were to have received one.232 Of the thirty-seven mathematicians, 
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astronomer-astrologers, geographers, and cartographers at Henry’s court, twenty-five had 
received a Bachelor of Arts degree and all but two received them from either Oxford or 
Cambridge.233 This suggests both the rise in the importance of a university education and 
also the degree to which this education had become a national affair. The universities and 
the courts became more closely linked beginning as early as the mid-sixteenth century 
and this relationship expanded throughout the early seventeenth. The chancellorship of 
both Oxford and Cambridge belonged to major nobles during both the Elizabethan and 
Jacobean eras— Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, a notable astrological enthusiast, held 
the chancellorship of Oxford from 1564 until his death in 1588, and William Cecil, Lord 
Burghley, held the chancellorship of Cambridge from 1560 until his death in 1598.234 
Burghley’s son Robert Cecil, Early of Salisbury, a major patron of the sciences, would go 
on to be the Chancellor of Cambridge from 1601 to 1612.235 The chancellorship of both 
universities throughout the reign of James I remained firmly in the hands of nobles who 
patronized the arts and sciences. 
 The universities, however, remained locations for a traditional knowledge-base 
with content derived from classical antiquity and teaching and learning methodology 
derived from high medieval Scholasticism.236 The original intention of the medieval 
Scholastic system was to employ dialectical reason and logic in order to resolve 
contradictions between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology. Typically, a 
university professor revealed the contradictions between two sources of knowledge, 
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argued them from both sides, and proposed a resolution.  A normal class included a lectio 
(“lecture,” or more precisely “reading”), in which a professor read verbatim from an 
important text—usually Scripture, Aristotle, the writings of the Church fathers, or recent 
commentary on these—and occasionally supplemented this with his own remarks.237 
Alternatively, professors used the disputatio, or quaestio disputatio (“discussion of a 
question”), where they would answer questions proposed by students beforehand using 
Aristotelian logic to come to their conclusions.238 These methods emerged out of the 
early university system of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and were generally still 
considered standard as late as the early seventeenth century. The university curriculum 
followed the trivium of Latin grammar and rhetoric along with logic, and the quadrivium 
of astronomy, music, arithmetic, and geometry. More advanced students often went on to 
study medicine, law, or theology.239 Although new insights into natural philosophy often 
found their way into the traditional curriculum, they remained ancillary to the established 
liberal arts. 
 Even though they were enthusiastic patrons of the sciences at court, both Queen 
Elizabeth I and King James I maintained the status quo in the universities. In 1588, upon 
receiving a petition for a reform in the curriculum at St. John’s College, Cambridge, 
                                                          
237
 Hollister and Bennett, Medieval Europe: A Short History, 312. See also Sten Ebbesen, “Ancient Logic 
as the Source for Medieval Scholastic Logic”, in The Cambridge History for Later Medieval Philosophy: 
From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600, eds. Norman 
Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 101-127; 
and Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth Century Cambridge, 10-11. 
238
 Costello, The Scholastic Curriculum at Early Seventeenth Century Cambridge, 11. An alternate version 
of this method was known as the quodlibet (literally, “to do as one pleases,” but used to mean “question at 
random”) in which the question was not known beforehand, and the professor would answer the question 
on an ad hoc basis. The disputatio followed a particular structure of quaestio, responsio, et determinatio 
(“question, response, and conclusion”), while the quodlibet was less structured.  
239
 Ibid., 10. 
100 
 
Elizabethan lawmakers reinforced the traditional Scholastic system, calling it “best…for 
the increase of learning, for the greater good of youth, for the state and benefit of the 
College.”240 Similarly, in 1601, newly appointed Chancellor Robert Cecil, Earl of 
Salisbury, specified that the Scholastic “Lectures and Disputations” be maintained, and 
that “all dueties and exercises of learninge be diligently and duely performed accordinge 
to the Statutes & Orders of the Universitie.”241 James I explicitly supported the traditional 
Scholastic system in 1619 by commanding that “no new erected Lectures…be permitted 
to withdrawe Scholars from their attendance on the exercises of Learning, Lectures, 
Disputations, Determinations, or Declarations, either publique or private.”242 While they 
remained open to a variety of experimental and unconventional approaches to knowledge 
acquisition at court, royal authorities and the nobility remained resistant to change in the 
institutional university. This not only suggests that royal authorities desired to maintain 
control of how knowledge was disseminated and received but also that they viewed the 
type of knowledge attained at universities and practiced at court as two separate 
enterprises. Presumably, universities provided a stable and standardized curriculum and 
methodology that, by its very unchanging nature, ensured that all future scholars would 
be familiar with the same body of knowledge and the same procedures of logical 
argumentation. At court, however, this methodology was frequently flouted in favor more 
empirical methods. 
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All manner of non-traditional scholars found homes at courts where they were 
offered some degree of protection from the more conservative churches and universities, 
where their work would have been seriously stifled. Significantly, all pre-Galilean 
Copernicans in England worked outside of Oxford and Cambridge and depended on 
patronage for their financial support, while the curriculum at both of those universities 
continued to emphasize the Ptolemaic system well into the seventeenth century.243 In fact, 
although well-known astronomers such as Everard Digby, William Temple, and Gabriel 
Harvey had begun to harshly criticize Aristotle at Cambridge as early as the 1560s, there 
is no evidence than any Copernican held any prominent position there until several 
decades into the seventeenth century.244  
During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the position of astrology 
also reflected the importance of the court system in the advancement of knowledge and 
its obvious differences from the university system. As early as the 1570s, Oxford and 
Cambridge professors were delivering lectures critical of judicial astrology, and in 1619, 
Oxford’s Savilian professor of astronomy was banned from teaching any astrology 
altogether, demonstrating not only the conservative nature of the universities but also the 
degree to which astrology had declined in intellectual respectability among some 
scientists.245 Astronomy and mathematics, two separate branches of study under the 
quadrivium of the seven liberal arts, rarely overlapped in their traditional study, but since 
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at least Copernicus, they had begun to coalesce more and more.246 A growing number of 
astrological skeptics in the scientific community consciously rejected the application of 
mathematics to astrology just as they applied mathematics more readily to the 
increasingly distinct science of astronomy.247 By 1649, the astrologer Jeremiah Shakerly 
was able to write to his mentor William Lilly that he “often wish[ed] a nearer affinity 
between the two Arts of Astronomie & Astrologie,” noting that by then, they had 
separated, and astronomy had gained the higher ground as mathematical science.248 
 During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the patronage system 
allowed for much freer thinking and allowed scholars to explore much more unorthodox 
topics than was possible at universities. The courts fostered a form of “post-scholastic” 
knowledge built on the foundation of a university education (since, by the early 
seventeenth century, most client-scientists at court had received one). Court client-
scientists oftentimes diverged from the university knowledge-base precisely because the 
research that they performed under the auspices of the court system contradicted what 
they learned at university.249 While English patrons often required empirical evidence to 
validate their financial support, universities required only adherence to the Scholastic 
method and logical argument. The Scottish writer John Barclay, who moved to England 
shortly after James’s ascension to the throne, singled out client-scientists at the English 
court for their willingness to oppose Aristotle and Ptolemy in the realm of cosmology, 
writing that “in philosophy and mathematics, in geography and astronomy, there is no 
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opinion so prodigious and strange, but in that island was either invented, or has found 
followers and subtile instancers.”250 More importantly, patrons’ demands for empirical, 
observational, and experimental evidence meant that methodology based on logical 
proofs and argumentation faded in importance in the courts more rapidly than in the 
universities.  
This formula for arriving at knowledge and evaluating evidence found its most 
fervent proponent in the works of Francis Bacon. Bacon’s emphasis on empirical 
methodology greatly impacted Scientific Revolution-era natural philosophers, 
particularly in England. His major work on the topic, the Novum Organon of 1620, 
systematically presented his argument against Aristotelian syllogistic logic and for a form 
of inductive reasoning based on empirical evaluation of evidence. The very name Novum 
Organon evoked Aristotle’s Organon, the compiled body of Aristotle’s six works on 
logic, which Bacon hoped to invalidate. Bacon’s criticism of Aristotelian logic, “which 
served rather to fix and give stability to errors…than to help the search after truth” was 
also a direct criticism of the Scholastic methods of the universities, which rested on the 
foundations of Aristotelian logic.251 Bacon stressed that scientists “can do and understand 
so much and so much only as [they] have observed in fact…of the course of nature” and 
that “our only true hope lies in induction.”252 By linking observation, empiricism, and 
induction, Bacon promoted a set of techniques that allowed seventeenth-century scientists 
to standardize and homogenize their practice. Furthermore, Bacon also recognized that by 
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discovering and better understanding the laws of nature, scientists could better control 
nature. In the oft quoted passage describing “human power and human knowledge 
meet[ing] in one,” Bacon instructed that “where a cause is not known an effect cannot be 
produced—nature to be commanded must be obeyed.”253 According to Bacon, scientists 
could not control nature without first understanding natural laws. 
Bacon, at least in part, had astrology in mind when he wrote this. Three years 
after the Novum Organon, Bacon wrote De Augmentis Scientarum, which further 
expounded upon his program of empiricism and inductive reasoning through pithy 
aphorisms that commented on many areas of human knowledge, astrology among 
them.254 Bacon’s view of astrology was much like that of Kepler and other reformers who 
recognized that if astrology were to be considered a valid science, it must be subjected to 
scientific methodology. “As for Astrology,” Bacon wrote, “it is so full of superstition, 
that scarcely anything sound can be discovered in it. Notwithstanding, I would rather 
have it purified than rejected altogether.”255 Bacon’s directions for reform, however, were 
prescriptive and programmatic and laid out a methodological system which he hoped 
astrologers would use in order to reform their science. He merely opened the door—he 
asked practicing astrologers to walk through it. 
Bacon’s new methodological thinking influenced mathematical astrologers for a 
time. For example, the astrologer Jeremiah Shakerley wrote, “Why then shall we subject 
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ourselves to the authority of the Ancients, when our own experience can inform us 
better?”256 Similarly, the astrologer Joshua Childrey, who was also a telescopic observer 
of the heavens, remarked that heliocentrism had been demonstrated “ad oculum,” or “by 
sight,” and commented that it made no more scientific sense to continue to practice 
astrology under the Ptolemaic system.257 In fact, those who attempted a Baconian reform 
practiced what some contemporaries referred to as astrologia sana, or “sane 
astrology.”258 However, Bacon’s request for an empirically-based astrology was a 
double-edged sword. On the one hand, as with the mathematical reforms attempted by 
scientists since the time of Pico della Mirandola and Copernicus, a further reform 
employing the Baconian inductive method allowed judicial astrologers to claim more 
ground as legitimate scientific practitioners. On the other hand, astrologers were 
ultimately addressing problems that had no solutions and the increased application of 
empiricism to astrology only further revealed its scientific inadequacies. 
It was during the second half of the seventeenth century that the decline of 
astrology as a legitimate scientific practice became clear. As we have seen, 
Copernicanism in general did not have any ill-effects on the practice of astrology, and for 
those astrologer-astronomers mathematically savvy enough to recognize its advantages 
and appropriate its methods for the benefit of astrology, Copernicanism actually solved 
some of the problems of astrology. What contributed to the downfall of astrology in the 
scientific community? The principal complaints against astrology from its detractors had 
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been largely political and religious—the scientific complaints against it were typically 
made by those who wished, not to destroy it, but to reform it. But by the second half of 
the seventeenth century, it began to be ridiculed scientifically as well. Far more damaging 
for astrology than the Copernican theory was the discovery of more astronomical bodies, 
beginning with the Galilean moons of Jupiter in 1610. While not explicitly contradictory 
to the tenets of astrology, the existence of more heavenly bodies suggested to many that 
all prior astrological literature was flawed because it did not, indeed could not, take into 
account the influence of these moons.259  
 More complications arose with increased European travel to the southern 
hemisphere. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and particularly 
following the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, English voyages to the New World 
and to locations south of the equator rose dramatically as the English joined the Spanish, 
Portuguese, Dutch, and French in overseas exploration. Astrological critics noted that 
with an entirely new set of stars up until then unseen and unknown by Europeans, an 
entire new set of rules would be required to explain the effects of the stars and planets on 
people living in these locations.260 Furthermore, the locations of the planets, sun, and 
moon were in different constellations during different seasons in the southern 
hemisphere, and these could not be reconciled with the way astrology had been practiced 
from the time of Ptolemy to the early modern era without serious revision. For example, 
in his Tetrabiblos, Ptolemy had designated Leo “the sign of the sun” because the sun was 
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in the constellation Leo during the warmest time of the year from late July to late August. 
Critics argued that in the southern hemisphere this should be reversed, and Aquarius 
should be designated the sign of the sun.261  Both detractors of astrology such as Pico 
della Mirandola and reformers such as John Dee recognized this. 
 The idea of the infinity of the universe and the ever expanding catalogue of stars 
also complicated astrological practice. The idea of an infinite universe, proposed by 
Western astronomer-astrologers such as Nicholas of Cusa and Marcellus Palingenius, 
dated back as far as the mid-fifteenth century.262 Noted pre-Galilean Copernicans and 
adherents to judicial astrology Thomas Digges and Giordano Bruno both posited a sun-
centered universe with an infinite number of stars extending into infinite space. The 
introduction of even more heavenly bodies—from the Galilean moons of Jupiter to the 
increasingly abundant stars discovered with the help of the telescope—merely multiplied 
the complexity. Among reformist astrologers, the effects of the heavens on human events 
could be determined through closer observation of the heavens and more precise 
measurements of the movements of the stars and planets, but this became significantly 
more difficult as the objects in the heavens seemed to increase exponentially.263 
 This difficulty had been taken up by both John Dee and Thomas Digges in the 
mid-sixteenth century. Though he had maintained the Ptolemaic notion of a sphere of 
fixed stars, Dee had admitted a similar problem when attempting to discern the means by 
which heavenly bodies exerted an influence over the earth. According to Dee, the 
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astrological influences of the stars and planets were carried in the light they emitted. This 
light emerged and formed a cone in which the planet or star of origin marked the vertex 
and the surface of earth touched by this light marked it base. The further away a planet or 
star was from the earth, argued Dee, the more surface area it illuminated, and thus, the 
greater power it had to affect human events.264 If Digges followed Dee’s interpretation of 
the power of stars as inversely proportional to their distance from the earth, which is quite 
possible given their former professional relationship, then Digges’s new model of an 
infinite Copernican cosmos created even more complexities for reformist astrologers.265 
On the one hand, the stars now stood at a much greater distance from the earth than they 
had with Copernicus’s sphere of fixed stars, meaning that their influence on the earth was 
even greater. On the other hand, if every individual star stood at varying distances from 
the earth, then it made precise measurement all but impossible for reformist astrologers. 
Unfortunately, Digges left no record of having directly adapted his astrology to this 
cosmological structure. 
 Astronomer-astrologers in England had not yet resolved this problem by the early 
seventeenth century. In fact, amidst the accumulation of new stars and moons discovered 
about the planets, many astronomer-astrologers consciously limited the number of stars 
they accepted as important for complete knowledge of their astrological effects. Just days 
after Galileo’s publication of Sidericus Nuncius in 1610—which announced his 
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discoveries of mountains and valleys on the moon, the phases of Venus, and moons 
circling Jupiter—Henry Wotton wrote to Robert Cecil, Earl of Salisbury, that “upon the 
whole subject, he [Galileo] hath overthrown all former astronomy…and next all 
astrology. For the virtue of these new planets must needs vary the judicial part, and why 
may there not yet be more.”266 In 1624, astrologer and almanac publisher George 
Hawkins wrote that the amount of stars astrologers should regard as relevant for use in 
prognostications “should be limited to 1,025 stars and no more” since astronomers and 
astrologers should not be expected to “take account of every little star.”267 Significantly, 
the figure of 1,025 was derived from Ptolemy’s star catalogue, which counted 1,028 stars, 
while admitting the possibility that there were more.268 Just four years later in 1628, 
almanac-writer Eustace Clarke, a Copernican, wrote of many more stars, claiming that 
The number of fixed Starres is commonly defined as 1725, although their exact 
number cannot indeed be exactly limited, being almost infinite as the 
Astronomers do descrie, by an help of the hollow instrument of the invention of 
Galilaeus: By said instrument, Venus is discerned with the eie, increasing and 
decreasing as the moon. Saturne is seen having three bodies [i.e., rings]; Jupiter 
having four other Starres moving with him for his attending guard. Likewise the 
Sunne himselfe appeareth diversely spotted as the Moon…269 
 
Both the addition of known stars augmented by the observations of Tycho Brahe and the 
discovery of new celestial bodies by Galileo seriously brought into question judicial 
astrology as it was practiced in the mid-seventeenth century.      
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 While mathematical astrology found difficulties among both its critics and 
reformers, popular texts flourished among the increasingly literate populace of England, 
whose access to astrology was facilitated primarily through the publication of almanacs 
and short tracts on its practice.  Almanacs helped to popularize Copernican astronomy as 
well as astrology, particularly in the first half of the seventeenth century, and the focus of 
many almanacs on applied astrology meant that in many cases, expositions of the 
Copernican theory and astrology went hand in hand, usually in non-mathematical ways. 
In fact, most people educated enough to read pamphlets received most of their knowledge 
about astronomy, including the Copernican system, through astrological almanacs and 
manuals.270  
 Almanacs of the early seventeenth century marked a transitional period from the 
influence of scientific, mathematical astrology to the popularity of non-mathematical 
astrology. As we have seen from examples such as Leonard and Thomas Digges’s 
Prognostication Everlastinge, almanacs often offered a variety of compendious 
information of astronomical, astrological, meteorological, or agricultural significance. 
Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, these were often highly 
technical manuals that employed complex mathematics, and many recommended the use 
of Copernican mathematics for astronomical and astrological calculations. However, 
while many popular astrologers of the mid-seventeenth century relied on the same 
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mathematical calculations as the astrological reformers, they ceased to emphasize these 
technical details in their almanacs.271  
This transition occurred over several decades. For example, one of the most 
ardent Copernican astrologers and popular almanac publishers of the 1610s was Thomas 
Bretnor. A self-styled “professor of mathematicks and student of the physickes,” Bretnor 
openly mocked those who refused to accept Copernicanism despite the mathematical and 
observational evidence, referring to the geocentric theory of Ptolemy as a “vulgar 
opinion” and an “old fantasie.”272 Bretnor often took note in his description of the 
movement of the heavenly bodies that when he wrote about the sun’s movement, he 
meant not that it truly moved, but that it appeared to move relative to the earth: 
This Brumal season, commonly called Winter, and visually taken for the first 
quarter of our Astronomicall yeare, tooke its beginning the 11 or December last: 
for then (according to the old dotage [the geocentric theory]) did the Sun enter the 
first scruple of the cold and the melancholicke signe Capricorne, or rather 
according to the verity this earthy planet entering the first minute of Cancer, and 
furthest deflected from the Sunnes perpendicular raies, did then receiue least 
portion of Sunshine, and greatest quantitie of shadow.273  
Later, Bretnor went on to change various descriptions in his own almanacs regarding the 
locations of the planets with relation to the constellations, for example, rewriting “the sun 
in Aries” as “the earth in Libra” to better conform to the Copernican cosmos.274 His 
almanac, published annually from 1607 until 1635, consistently employed Copernican 
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mathematics and mentioned Ptolemy or the geocentric system only to ridicule them. 
Similarly, the popular Copernican astrologer Joshua Childrey wrote in 1652 that all 
calculations regarding the positions of the planets should be made “with respect to the 
sun” rather than “with respect to the earth,” as many still did.275 Both Bretnor and 
Childrey advocated these changes out of a desire to see more precise calculations 
regarding the positions of the planets and more accurate predictions. However, these 
astrologers were among the last generation to emphasize mathematics or even 
Copernicanism in their almanacs as a means of promoting their own legitimacy. 
Seventeen years later, in 1669, Childrey wrote to Henry Oldenburg, secretary of the 
Royal Society, wondering “why in that Synopsis of…Sprats history [of the Royal 
Society], ye Aspects of ye Planets should be omitted.”276 Childrey lamented that 
astrologers were no longer interested in the systematic mathematical reform that had 
characterized the earlier century. Once readers assumed that astrologers’ methods were 
scientific, their interests turned to their ability to correctly prognosticate future human 
events.     
 By the 1630s few almanac-makers or practicing astrologers adhered to the 
Ptolemaic system any longer, and the debate for the next two decades revolved around 
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the applicability of astrology to the Copernican and Tychonic systems. The Tychonic 
system, named after Tycho Brahe and sometimes referred to as the geoheliocentric 
theory, was a hybrid system that combined the mathematics of the Copernican system 
with the physical conception of the Ptolemaic system. In the Tychonic system, the sun 
and moon revolved around an immobile earth while the five planets revolved around the 
sun. Mathematically, it accounted for the motion of the heavenly bodies as precisely as 
the Copernican system, but unlike Copernicus, Tycho included many of his own 
observations of the heavens when he presented his theory.277 Ironically, it was these very 
observations that eventually led Johannes Kepler, Tycho’s former assistant, to the 
conclusion that the planetary orbits were elliptical rather than circular, thus negating the 
need for Tycho’s system. “I confess that when Tycho died,” Kepler later wrote, perhaps 
with some guilt, “I quickly took advantage of the absence, or lack of circumspection, of 
[Tycho’s] heirs, by taking the observations under my care, or perhaps usurping them.”278 
Though a Copernican, Kepler also based his Rudolphine Tables of 1627, which replaced 
the now-outdated Prutenic Tables of 1551, on Tycho’s observations. By the 1650s, the 
Tychonic system had few adherents in the English astronomical or astrological 
communities.  
Practicing popular astrologers, however, removed themselves from the 
mathematical and scientific debate. As late as the 1680s, the English astrologer and 
almanac-writer John Goad reassured his followers that astrology could operate under any 
cosmological framework and that if the debate between the Copernican and Tychonic 
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systems “proves to be non-Conclusive, we must need averr, that our principle of 
Prognostic is unquestionable.”279 As patrons’ interest in astrology declined, they 
employed fewer and fewer astrologers at court, and these astrologers often found 
themselves employed by the public at large, whose purchase of their almanacs constituted 
their primary income.280 Ephemerides, those multi-year collections of planetary tables 
upon which astrologers had once heavily relied, ceased to contain their astrological 
components by the final third of the seventeenth century.281 In the sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries, ephemerides often contained lengthy introductions describing their 
astrological uses, horoscopes, and tables specifically exhibiting the aspects, or the relative 
angles between two heavenly bodies. By the 1670s and 1680s, most ephemerides had 
dropped all explicit references to astrology. Correspondingly, by the turn of the 
eighteenth century, the complex mathematical demonstrations from the almanacs 
showing how to determine the positions of the planets oneself had almost entirely 
vanished, leaving only a non-mathematical description of the planets’ aspects.282 No 
longer preoccupied with justifying their practice through the latest mathematical and 
astronomical advances, the scientific reform of astrology subsided.  
 While evidence of this decline in mathematical astrology exists in the textual 
records of these ephemerides, its cultural origins date back to at least the 1640s and the 
coming of the English Civil War. On the eve of the war in 1642, the royal government 
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exerted complete control over the legal status of astrology, and following the example of 
both the Elizabethan and Jacobean governments, Charles I allowed astrologers to practice 
and publish provided that they refrained from prognosticating anything negative about 
the royal government.283 As late as 1641, a Jacobean law required that “all printers and 
booksellers” who publish “any prophecies or almanacs” must have them “seen or revized 
by the archbishop or bishop (or those who shall be expressly appointed for that purpose) 
and approved by their certificates, and, in addition, shall have permission from us or from 
our ordinary judges.”284 However, following the Long Parliament’s defiance of Charles 
I’s authority and the king’s absconding from London in January 1642, the censorship 
system collapsed and the publication of pamphlets and almanacs increased 
exponentially.285  
Before 1640, no printed newspapers existed in England; by 1645, there were over 
a hundred in print, and nearly all contained astrological predictions.286 Similarly, 
pamphlets—short political tracts published cheaply, often with astrological overtones—
multiplied as well. George Thomason, a mid-seventeenth century book collector, claimed 
to have collected only twenty-two astrological pamphlets in 1640, while he found nearly 
two thousand just two years later.287 The Civil War contributed to a sort of pamphlet 
warfare between astrologers who were Parliamentarians and those who were Royalists, 
and political and religious concerns motivated pamphleteers and their consumers far 
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more than scientific ones. The uncertainty that accompanied the English Civil War and 
the Interregnum contributed to a drastic increase in what many contemporary scientists 
somewhat disparagingly called “vulgar astrology,” while the execution of Charles I and 
the removal of his court from power in 1649 meant that the patron-client relationship that 
had fostered scientific and mathematical astrology for over a century had come to an 
end.288           
  By the time of the Restoration of the monarchy and the coronation of Charles II in 
1660, astrology, as it was accepted in English society, had irrevocably changed. Despite 
the fact that the monarchy survived the Civil War and the nobility returned to court 
largely intact, the locus of scientific activity moved to a newfound institution, the Royal 
Society.289 Founded in the very year of the Restoration, the Royal Society promoted the 
Baconian ideals of experimentalism and empiricism and provided English scientists with 
an official community within which to conduct research. Astrology was almost entirely 
absent from its records. Entire years went by without its mention, and when scientists did 
discuss it, they often did so negatively.290 The lack of experimental demonstrability 
suggested to many scientists that, as anti-astrological writer Thomas Cooper contended, 
“the rules of this art have no foundation in experience.”291 By the late 1650s, according to 
the astrologer John Gadbury, students at both Oxford and Cambridge could not be 
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bothered to study judicial astrology, “bawl[ing] loudly in the Schools” that “astrology is 
not a science.”292  
At the very same time, popular almanacs remained on the rise. At their height in 
the late 1650s, astrological pamphlets and almanacs accounted for as much as one third 
of all English book sales, and after the Bible, were reportedly the most widely read works 
in all of England.293 The general populace did not require the type of utilitarian proof that 
patrons coveted in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, nor did they insist on 
adherence to empirical or experimental methodology. Despite the fact that late 
seventeenth-century pamphleteers, almanac-makers, and common astrologers still 
practiced a form of astrology largely derived from the mathematical astrology of the 
previous century, they had no need to convince their primary customers—the English 
public—of the scientific efficacy of astrology. And as the scientific community 
consciously disassociated itself from the practice of astrology and redefined it as 
something outside the bounds of science, the new, popular astrological community 
embraced it as a lucrative practice that the English populace craved. Where once it was in 
the interest of scientists to legitimate astrology as a mathematical science, it became in 
their best professional interest to scorn it.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
“The majority of that which is called superstition 
is born from a mistaken application of mathematics.” 
 
–Johann Wolfgang von Goethe 
“The question of all questions for humanity,  
the problem which lies behind all others and  
is more interesting than any of them,  
is that of the determination of man’s place  
in nature and his relation to the cosmos.”  
 
– T.H. Huxley 
 
 Contrary to traditional historiography, the Copernican theory did not contribute to 
the demise of judicial astrology. In fact, among those reformers within the English 
patronage system who utilized Copernican mathematics to more precisely predict the 
motions of the planets, it actually strengthened its legitimacy. The reformist astrologers 
intent on making judicial astrology a more exact science appropriated new mathematical 
tables where they could. As patrons defined the value of science in terms of its practical 
utility, many English judicial astrologers successfully argued for scientific legitimacy 
based on their ability to precisely predict planetary locations. Provided that patrons 
persisted in considering this modus operandi practically useful, judicial astrologers 
continued to flourish within this system. However, while the positions of the stars and 
planets became increasingly predictable in post-Copernican astronomy, prognostication 
of human events did not.   
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 The process of by which early modern scientists redefined and re-categorized 
knowledge about astrology occurred within the context of the Scientific Revolution. The 
utilization of observational techniques and experimentation, the employment of logically 
inductive reasoning, and the precise quantification of data all signified major 
transformations in the way scholars acquired knowledge about the physical world. Yet 
early modern scientists did not adopt these methodological characteristics all at once, nor 
did they all accord them equal legitimacy. Those early modern astrologer-astronomers 
who embraced these techniques quickly found themselves with much more precise data 
regarding the positions and motions of sun, moon, stars, and planets. Given these new 
defining characteristics of science and the technical problems besetting Ptolemaic 
observational astronomy, it is unsurprising that many early modern astrologer-
astronomers attempted to subject their practice to the rigors of these new methods in 
order to proclaim scientific authenticity and secure patronage. During the sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, reformist astrologers became scientific by appropriating the 
mathematics of Copernicus in order to sustain their legitimacy. This process worked 
particularly well within the English patronage system. However, while precise 
mathematics led to more accurate measurements in other arenas of scientific thought, 
precise predictions of planetary and stellar positions failed to yield more accurate 
predictions of human events. Giorgio de Santillana has defined science as “the search for 
impersonal invariants behind events.”294 Despite the best efforts of reformist astrologers, 
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who girded judicial astrology with a new mathematical foundation, the events they 
sought to predict remained both highly personal and infinitely variable. 
 Astrology underwent major changes between the mid-sixteenth and mid-
seventeenth centuries as reformers attempted to maintain its scientific status, and these 
modifications had both external and internal aspects. Externally, in England, social, 
cultural, and economic factors all transformed how scientists thought about astrology. 
The rise in overseas exploration, the increase in literacy among the popular classes, the 
founding of the Royal Society, and the shift in interest of astrology’s principal financial 
supporters, the noble patrons, all deeply affected how astrologers practiced and how 
society valued them. Internally, the scientific process of attaining knowledge changed to 
incorporate new methods and new modes of inquiry. While mathematically precise 
calculations of the positions of the planets sufficed among scientific astrologers in the 
mid to late sixteenth century, this was no longer exclusively sufficient to be considered 
scientific by the mid seventeenth century. This process—both its external and internal 
variants—depended heavily on the primary audience of astrologers and who the arbiters 
of scientific value were. When it was patrons, practical, utilitarian concerns dominated. 
When it was the public at large, these concerns faded in importance next to the personal 
satisfaction that prognostication provided for astrological consumers. When it was 
scientists, by the mid-seventeenth century, more than merely mathematical precision was 
needed—astrology had to conform to the experimental method, to empirical evaluation, 
and to logical induction in order to be considered a science. Its inability to do so meant 
that scientists reclassified it beyond the boundaries of science.      
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 The story of astrology’s transformation is complicated. There is no monocausal 
explanation for why astrology changed when and how it did, and socio-cultural, 
economic, and methodological reasons all played a role. To speak of the demise of 
astrology, however, is to speak both ahistorically and with a clear retrospective bias. 
Because astrology ceased to be a science in the late seventeenth century, modern 
historians often write of its decline, failure, or death. But during this period of “decline” 
among the scientific community, astrology increased in popularity among the non-noble 
classes of England and transformed into the version that is most well-known today. 
Obviously, astrology is not dead—a simple perusal through the back pages of a 
newspaper or an Internet search reveal that it is very much alive and well.295  
Much like the historian of science Wayne Shumaker, who, despite his admitted 
antipathy toward modern practitioners of occult arts, professed hope that “disbelief has 
not got in the way of comprehension,” I have aspired to treat astrology on its own 
terms—which in early modern England means treating it as a science.296 Shumaker urged 
historians to treat the history of the occult within the context of the “history of ideas, as 
research into mental patterns of a distant period from which we have inherited much that 
is precious,” and astrology certainly fits this mold.297 We must not forget that the same 
impulse that caused Copernicus to proclaim triumphantly that “in so many…ways do the 
planets bear witness to the earth’s mobility” also gave astrologers the impetus to 
determine humanity’s relationship with the cosmos.   
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